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Governmental Response to
Campus Unrest
Bruce R. Hopkins
John H. Myers
I.

CAMPUS UNREST: ITS CONTEMPORARY

NATURE AND ORIGINS

LTHOUGH the phenomenon of campus unrest has pervaded
the United States in recent years, campus activism is not
new to this country. Instances of student and faculty disturbances
punctuate our history. As Julian H. Levi has written: "Neither
student unrest, nor political atA

tack is novel ....

These issues,
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itself."'

Moreover, campus unrest
has not been an uncommon oc-

Education Year,

there was

considerable activity by various
agencies of the United Nations,
the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the U.S. Department of State
that resulted in a sharing of the worldwide problems and solutions
concerning student and faculty disturbances on college and university campuses.5

I

Levi, Legal Aspects of University Governance, 50 EDUCATIONAL RECORD 405,
407-08 (1969).
2 See Student Power in University Affairs - A Symposium, 17 AM. J. COMP. L.
331 (1969).
3 The United Nations declared, and President Nixon proclaimed, 1970 as the International Education Year. U.N.G.A. Res. 2412, in 116 CONG. REC. E2188 (daily
ed. Mar. 18, 1970); Proclamation 3962, Feb. 12, 1970, in 116 CONG. REC. E2190
(daily ed., Mar. 18, 1970).
4 The Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Committee of the Inter-Parliamentary
Union adopted a resolution on "The Student in the University and Society of Today,"
originally drafted and inserted in the Congressional Record by Representative Robert
McClory (R-Ill.). 116 CONG. REC. H2726 (daily ed. April 7, 1970).
5 The text of a report on this topic presented to the Educational, Scientific, and Cul-

1971]

CAMPUS UNREST

Gone are the days when campus disorder meant panty raids,
goldfish-swallowing, or food riots. During the past decade, the
American citizenry has been forced to realize that campus unrest
and disorders may be associated with violence and even death.
Campus unrest has become commonplace, and often involves the
participation, or receives the condonation, of the sons and daughters
of those who deplore the development. As a result - especially
in light of this age of supercommunication - "[w]ith the advent
of student unrest - of 'student power' - there has been a great
erosion of the image of higher education in the public mind."' Accordingly, campus unrest is now a major political issue in the United
States.7 Much of the public debate over campus unrest, however, is
founded on a host of unfortunate misunderstandings. It has been
expressed - and the authors concur - that "most political discussions of campus unrest bear almost no relationship to the known
facts [and] are a mixture of misinformation, innuendo, stereotyping
and falsification.""
The term "campus unrest" is obviously a vague one, and it
therefore means many things to many people. The term is that
utilized by the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, which
conceded it has an "undifferentiated meaning" because the term
"now embraces not only the intellectual ferment which should exist
in the university but also all forms of protest, both peaceful and
otherwise."'
The Commission categorized "campus unrest" as
"peaceful and orderly manifestations of dissent," as well as "[o]ther
protest [which] is disorderly, that is, disruptive, violent or terroristic."'1° This concept of dual modes of campus unrest was also
suggested by authorities who, in reliance upon studies by the Office
of Research of the American Council on Education, distinguished
between nonviolent and violent protest. Nonviolent protest was
defined as
rural Committee of the Inter-Parliamentary Union appears at 116 CONG. REC. E2029
(daily ed. Mar. 16, 1970), and 116 CoNG. REc. E2111 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1970).
6 Hatfield, Public Pressures on Higher Education, in THE TROUBLED CAMPUS 75
(G. Smith ed. 1970).
7
National concern over campus unrest, as reported by the Gallup Poll, probably
peaked around March 1969. Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 1969, § H, at 1.
8
Keniston & Lerner, The Unholy Alliance Against The Campus, N.Y. Times, Nov.
8, 1970 (Magazine), at 28, 83.
9
REPORT OF THE PREsmENT's Co~m'N ON CAMPUS UNREST at ix (1970) [hereinafter cited as CAMPUS UNREST REPORT].
10 Id. at x.
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any campus incident during the year [1968-19691 which involved (a) occupation of building or section of building, (b) barring of entrance to building, (c) holding officials captive, (d) interruption of school function (e.g., classes, speech, or meetings),
or (e) general campus strike or boycott of classes or of school
function,
and violent protest was defined as
any campus incident during the year which involved (a) burning of building, (b) damage to building or furnishings, (c) destruction of records, files, papers, (d) campus march, picketing,
or rally with physical violence, (e) one or more persons killed,
or (f) some persons injured."
Other modes of campus activism, involving nonphysical and nondisruptive protest (such as letters to the editor, individual threats,
circulation of petitions, and nonviolent marches and rallies), have
been deemed "a traditional part of the academic milieu" and con-

sequently are not considered to be "campus unrest.' '
Contemporary campus unrest is an evolutionary product of the
civil rights movement and the anti-Indochina War movement.
What was once a movement to protest for the right of free speech,
typified by the University of California at Berkeley revolt in 1964,
has developed into a radical, political-revolutionary movement,
exemplified and perpetuated by the Columbia University episode in
1968. This article need not recite the history of the current student
movement; the benchmarks are familiar to many: the Students for
a Democratic Society's Port Huron Statement (1962), the Free
Speech Movement (1964), the reaction to escalation of the Vietnam War (1965), the University of Michigan teach-in (1965), the
Democratic National Convention and the "police riot" (1968), the
Cambodian invasion and the nationwide student strike (1970), the
Kent State University and Jackson State College tragedies (1970),
and the bombing of the University of Wisconsin's mathematics
research center (1970).
Emphasis herein is deliberately placed
on "contemporary" campus unrest, namely, events of the past

decade.
Our concern is not so much with the form of behavior denominated as "campus unrest" or its contemporary genesis as with the
responses of federal and state governments to its occurrence. Campus unrest, consisting of both civil discord and criminal misconduct,
"1 Bayer & Astin, Violence and Disruption on the Campus, 1968-1969, in 50 EDUCATIONAL REcORD 337, 339 (1969) (relying upon various works of the Office of Research of the American Council on Education).
12

Id.
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CAMPUS UNREST

has quite predictably engendered governmental responses designed
to quell the uprisings and avoid their recurrence. These responses,
for the most part, have been and continue to be reflections of the
frustrations, emotions and sometimes angry reactions of many
American citizens, resulting from 10 years of unrelenting exposure
to protests, riots, property destruction, personal injuries, and killings
associated with campus unrest.13 Federal and state governments principally the legislatures, where the national distress has been
most dramatically reflected - have regarded campus unrest as a
"problem" to be corrected by one or more "solutions." To again
quote Julian H. Levi, "Americans, of course, are gadget-minded
people, legislatively inclined to believe that any public problem is
14
capable of solution by change in method."'
The legislative response to campus unrest has manifested itself
in various fashions at both the federal and state levels. As a "solution" to the "problem," legislators have most often advocated
that additional proscribed activities or increased penalties for
existing proscriptions be incorporated into their respective criminal
codes. The Commission on Campus Unrest, however, strongly
cautioned against and stressed the futility of viewing campus unrest
as a "problem" solvable simply through increased legislative proscriptions:
The basic difficulty with [popular explanations of campus unresti is that they begin by assuming that all campus unrest is a
problem - a problem whose cause is a moral failure on the part
of students or of society or of government, and which therefore has
a specifiable solution. The search for causes is thus inseparable
from the allocation of blame and advocacy of some course of public action. As a result, causes which are not within human control or which do not lay the mantle of culpability upon specific individuals or groups tend to be ignored. Such "explanations" do
not really explain. They only make campus unrest more bewildering - and more polarizing - than it need be.15
Implicit in this statement, and explicitly propounded by the Com13Speaking of the sentiment of the public at large and the federal government
toward campus unrest, Senator Charles H. Percy (R.-Ill.), in an open letter to college
and university students, faculty, and administration in Illinois, wrote:
In my view, both the general public and public officials are, in words I have
heard a thousand times, "fed up." Their patience is exhausted. The majority
wants order restored to our campuses, by whatever means, and it is no longer
interested in what it considers to be esoteric debates over "responsiveness,"
or "relevance" or "social consciousness." 116 CONG. REc. S15,843 (daily
ed. Sept. 17, 1970).
14
Levi, supra note 1, at 409.
15
CAMPUS UNREST REPORT, supra note 9, at 54.
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mission elsewhere in its report,16 is the conclusion that many aspects
of campus unrest are not susceptible to traditional forms of governmental response.
Realizing that "no rational response to campus unrest is possible
until its nature and causes have been fully understood,"' 7 the Commission identified some root causes and what may be termed the
"promotional" causes of campus unrest. The promotional causes
are three: (1) racial injustice and denial of civil rights to
minorities, (2) the seemingly incessant Indochina War, and (3)
the contemporary mode of higher education, including the universities' impersonalization, rules and regulations, irrelevant curriculums,
and purported complicity with the federal government. Most incidents of campus unrest have these promotional causes at the forefront as the "issues" which ostensibly precipitate the unrest.
The Commission found that while the promotional causes
have given campus unrest "specific focus" and continue to provide
its "special intensity,"' 8 the root causes are much more important.
These underlying causes of campus unrest were summarized by the
Commission as "the advance of American society into the postindustrial era, the increasing affluence of American society, and the
expansion and intergenerational evolution of liberal idealism."' 9
"Together," added the Commission, these root causes have
"prompted the formation of a new youth culture" which "rejects
' 20
what it sees to be the operational ideals of American society.
Furthermore, "American student protest ....

signifies a broad and

intense reaction against - and a possible future change in modern Western society and its organizing institutions."'"
Similarly, the Special Committee on Campus Tensions, initiated
in June of 1969 by the American Council on Education, isolated five
general theories of the underlying causes of student unrest:22 (1)
generational conflict, "in which youth rebel against the values and
beliefs of their fathers and act out their disaffections by assaulting
tradition and institutions, including universities" (but other findings,
states the Special Committee, show that "student activists are likely
16 Id. at 55.
17tId.

at 51.

is Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 52.
21
22

Id.
EPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON CAMPUS TENSIONS OF THE AM. COUNCIL

ON EDUC., CAMPUS TENSIONS: ANALYSIS

AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

12-15 (1970).
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to share [parental) beliefs and to enjoy close relationships with
their parents"); (2) social "irrelevance" of youth, that is, that youth
in affluent societies are "socially obsolescent, that they are kept too
long in a state of dependence when what they most need is [an]
opportunity to feel socially and personally useful and 'relevant' "
and that "attending college is, for many youth, an unsought experience"; (3) obsolete educational practices, which, from a radical
viewpoint, reveal that "colleges and universities are structurally
incapable of providing effective education in the modern age," and
which, from a more moderate stance, evince the need for "increased
provision for independent learning, more student initiative in curriculum design, experimental education, and a reduction of formal
course requirements for degrees"; (4) a breakdown of legitimate
authority, that is, the situation whereby "[ajuthority, as it has
been traditionally held and exercised, no longer commands respect," with the result that "traditional mechanisms of campus
governance are no longer appreciated"; (5) the social malaise
thesis, namely, the concept that "the university's troubles [are closely
linked] to the troubles of the society at large."2
Kingman Brewster, President of Yale University, identifies two
primary factors underlying campus unrest. First, he sees unrest
stemming from the "involuntary campus," a condition produced by
"distortion of the motivation for going to college," which, in an
"excessive lockstep continuity of learning from age five to twentyfive," stultifies student motivation.24 Second, he writes of the
"manipulated society," in which people "sense that society is more
manipulated than it is free, more dosed than it is open," and in
which economic power, the opinion industry, and politics are becoming unduly concentrated. 5
Viewed in the above perspectives, campus unrest becomes an
exceedingly perplexing, murky, and often viscerally disturbing social
condition, beyond the bounds of legislative or federal administrative
regulation. It is against this backdrop that we will be exploring recent legislative and administrative responses to campus unrest by the
federal and state governments.
23Id.

See also REPORT OF THE ABA COMM'N ON CAMPUS GOVERNMENT AND

STuDEN DISSENT, reprinted in 116 CONG. REc. E4594 (daily ed. May 21, 1970).
24
Brewster, The Involuntary Campus and the Manipulated Society, 51 EDuCATIONAL RECORD 101, 102 (1970).
25Id. at 103. For another study of the issues over which campus disorders have
occurred in the United States, see Stern, Campus Environments and Student Unrest, in
AGONY AND PROMISE 123 (G. Smith ed. 1969).
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Although, as has been noted, campus activism is not new to the
United States, in recent years campus unrest has embodied a new
dimension: politicization of the higher education community. 6
This aspect of campus unrest raises anew serious questions about
the character of colleges and universities and their role in our
society. Antecedent forms of campus unrest principally stressed
the need for institutions of higher education to be more intellectually
open and more politically neutral. Today, however, considerable
emphasis is being placed on the use of colleges and universities as
political instruments.2
Refinements of this theme permeate the literature of the higher
education community. Some contend that colleges and universities
are and always have been politicized, with, as one commentator
writes, "the clear and present danger [being3 . . . the misuse and

abuse of the substantial power they have come to possess."2 8 Somewhat the same view is reflected in the conviction that "the issue is
no longer whether higher education organizations should attempt
to influence public policy at all - but rather in what kinds of
policy questions they should become actively involved in the future."2
This latter distinction is a crucial one: The dichotomy
between broad issues affecting society in general and the narrower
issues relating directly to the higher education enterprise may prove
to be the cardinal principle guiding the thrust of governmental
response to the "political" manifestations of campus unrest during
the coming years.
The Commission on Campus Unrest found this politicization of
higher education to be manifest during the Columbia University
revolt in 1968, where the radical students sought to "transform
[the university] into a revolutionary political weapon with which
they could attack the system."" ° This political involvement was
26

The phrase "politicization of the higher education community," as used throughout this article, essentially means the involvement of colleges and universities in "political" activities, principally through student and faculty activities, and, to an extent,
through their associations. See Scully, Academic Turmoil Grows Over Moves to "Politicize" Universities, Associations, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Jan. 13, 1969,
at 1.
27
Keniston and Lerner point out that both rightwing and leftwing extremists deplore the politicization of higher education; to the former, the university has become
"a launching pad for revolution," while to the latter, it has become "a tool of the military-industrial Establishment." Keniston & Lerner, supra note 8, at 29, col. 1.
28
Birenbaum, Lost Academic Souls, in AGONY AND PROMISE 18, 20 (G. Smith ed.
1969).
29 Bloland, Politicization of Higher Education Organizations, in AGONY AND
PROMISE 10, 11 (G. Smith ed. 1969).
30 CAMPUS UNREST REPORT, supra note 9, at 37.
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enhanced by the presidential campaign of former Senator Eugene
McCarthy in 1968 (when many students seemed to be obeying the
exhortations of the "establishment" to work within "the system"),
and the congressional campaigns and student strike of 1970. As
an outgrowth of the student strike, for example, Princeton University instituted what became known as the "Princeton Plan," whereby
classes were rescheduled to enable university students and faculty
to participate in political campaigns during the 2 weeks immediately
preceding the November 1970 elections. In addition, the Movement for a New Congress was originated at Princeton to elect candidates that opposed the Indochina War. In response to the student
strike, academic requirements were modified at many institutions to
facilitate "political" activities.
Stating that "the student revolution has become the dominant
instrument of social change," one observer wrote that "the protagonists are not students qua students but rather students as the
most identifiable and best organized segment of the young people
in our society."'" The writer concluded: "The campus revolt
represents a quest: a search for meaning in contemporary life, for
identity and self-knowledge, for social justice and peace." 32 Others,
however, are less enamored with the current manifestations of
campus unrest. For example, Russell Kirk, writing of the "present
plight of the educationist Establishment," advanced the conclusions
that "it is not in the nature of a university to nurture political
fanaticism and utopian designs" and that "[t]o demand that the
university devote itself to the libido dominandi is to demand that
the university commit intellectual and moral suicide."3 3 Another,
albeit less fervent, commentator shares Kirk's view:
Those who seek the transformation of our society will do well to
choose means which unite us, which do not needlessly provoke
more backlash, and which allow higher education to continue, for
a major resource of the new America is the college-educated.
Otherwise, we may destroy the university to facilitate the revolution
-

and, in the process lose both.34

In short, the extent to which politicization has occurred on the
3

lJohnston, Student Revolt and Social Revolution, 51
23 (1970).
321d. at 26.
33

EDUCATIONAL RECORD

22,

Kirk, The University and Revolution: An Insane Conjunction, in THE UNIVER67, 68, 71 (G. Weaver & J. Weaver eds. 1969) (reprinted

srTy AND REvOLUTION

by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey).
34
Etzioni, Universities: Strike, Strike, Strike?, 51 EDUCATIONAL
(1970).

RECORD

219, 221
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campus may best be summed up by the following statement of the
Commission on Campus Unrest:
For years, radicals had been working to politicize universities, and
in May 1970 entire universities were, in effect, mobilized against
the policies of the present national administration. Students, faculty members, and administrators united to turn their attention
away from scholarship to what seemed to them the far more urgent
demands of politics and of keeping protest activities nonviolent.
In May 1970, students did not strike against their universities; they
succeeded
in making their universities strike against national
5
policy.8
Despite the increasing politicization of higher education, colleges and universities, in their institutional capacity, have almost
unanimously refrained from political involvement. 8 Politicization
of higher education is instead being fostered by individuals principally students and faculty members - largely through peaceful
and orderly dissent and nonviolent protest. This distinction between
institutional and individual political activity is essential, not only
because the United States Constitution protects individual rights
of free speech, dissent, and assembly, but also because significant
involvement by the institutions in political processes would be
contrary to the conditions of their federal tax status and could also be
37
a violation of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act.
Thus, at the close of the first decade of contemporary student
unrest, many in the higher education community had turned to
participation in national politics; however, the close of the decade
also saw politics turning on the university. 8
II.

CAMPUS

UNREST AND THE ORGANIZED

CRIME CONTROL ACT OF

1970

Legislatures, particularly the United States Congress, are most
effective when they seek a definite legislative solution for a specific,
identifiable problem. Congress rarely attempts to guide the devel35 CAMPus UNREST REPORT, supra note 9, at 46.
36 "[']he evidence shows that extremely few American colleges or universities

have taken institutional positions on anything except matters that directly affect their
immediate self-interest." Keniston and Lerner, supra note 8, at 66, col. 2.
37 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1964). For a discussion of the Act's possible application to
institutions of higher education, see section V infra.
38 Senator Mark 0. Hatfield (R-Ore.) wrote: "The general ploy of the public and
political leadership has been to condemn the colleges and universities. The situation
has become such that there is political advantage - shall we say, political capital - in
attacking and exploiting the conditions of turbulence on the campuses of our nation."
Hatfield, supra note 6, at 76.

1971]

CAMPUS UNREST

opment of broad social policy and is even less likely to assume
the task of changing the direction of social policy.3 9 Shortrange "answers" to domestic problems are usually the easiest to
formulate and enact, and generally serve to satisfy public demands
for immediate action by their elected representatives.
Thus, the suggestion of the Commission on Campus Unrest that
it is futile to seek legislative "solutions" to many aspects of campus
unrest went unheeded, 40 and the 91st Congress generally focused on
the manifestations of campus unrest where the "mantle of culpability" is most easily placed: disruptive and violent behavior. The most
striking example of this approach is the final version of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,41 the legislative history of
which exemplifies the ability of the Congress to rapidly mobilize
in the aftermath of specific incidents of campus disorder and
42
violence.
The Act, which was signed into law by President Nixon on
October 15, 1970, is basically designed to combat and eradicate
crime in the United States by authorizing special investigating
grand juries, extending immunities and increasing protection of
cooperative witnesses, widening federal authority to circumscribe
illegal syndicated gambling, and prohibiting certain racketeering
activities. However, of greater relevance to this discussion are the
provisions added to curb incendiarism and govern the importation,
manufacture, distribution, and storage of explosive materials. 44
These latter provisions make it unlawful for anyone other than a
3

9 Commenting on the insular nature of Congress, Samuel P. Huntington observed:
During the twentieth century Congress has insulated itself from the new political forces which social change has generated and which are, in turn, generating more change. Hence the leadership of Congress has lacked the
incentive to take the legislative initiative in handling emerging social problems. Within Congress power has become dispersed among many officials,
committees, and subcommittees. Hence the central leadership of Congress

has lacked the ability to establish national legislative priorities. Huntington,
Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century, in THE CONGRESS AND
AmmcA's FuTURE 5, 8 (D. Truman ed. 1965).
40
CAMPUS UNREST REPORT, supra note 9, at 54-55.
41
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Star. 922.
42During the Senate debate on the proposed bill [S. 3650, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970)], Senator John L. McClellan (D-Ark.), Chairman of the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigation, cited a United States Department of the Treasury survey
revealing that during the period January 1, 1969 through April 13, 1970, there were
more than 40,000 bombings, attempted bombings, or threats of bombings, at least 43
killings and 400 injuries due to bombings, and resulting property damage in excess of
$25 million. 116 CONG. REC. S17,493 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1970).
43
Pub. L No. 91-452, 84 Star. 922.
44 18 U.S.C. §§ 841-48 (Supp. V, 1970).
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licensee to import, manufacture, or deal in explosive materials,45 and
for anyone other than a licensee or permittee to transport or receive any explosive materials in interstate or foreign commerce.46
Also, licensees may not knowingly distribute explosive materials to
minors, felons, fugitives from justice, mental defectives, or unlawful users of marihuana or drugs.47 The Treasury Department is
authorized to license and regulate explosives manufacturers, dealers,
8
and importers.

4

Of greatest importance to the higher education community is
the provision which imposes severe penalties on anyone who
maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other

personal or real property in whole or in part owned, possessed, or
used by, or leased to, the United States, any department or agency
thereof, or any institution or organization receiving Federal financial assistance ....

4

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is empowered by the Act to
investigate incendiarism on college and university campuses without
an invitation from administrators of the institutions involved or from
local law enforcement authorities.5"
45 Id. § 842(a) (1).
The term "explosive materials" means "explosives, blasting
agents, and detonators." Id. § 841(c). See also id. §§ 841(d)-(f).

461d. § 84 2(a) (3).
47Id. § 842(d).
48
1d. § 843.

491d. § 844(f) (emphasis added).
50 Id. § 846 provides:
The Secretary [of the Treasury] is authorized to inspect the site of any accident, or fire, in which there is reason to believe that explosive materials were
involved, in order that if any such incident has been brought about by accidental means, precautions may be taken to prevent similar accidents from
occurring. In order to carry out the purpose of this subsection, the Secretary
is authorized to enter into or upon any property where explosive materials
have been used, are suspected of having been used, or have been found in an
otherwise unauthorized location. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
as modifying or otherwise affecting in any way the investigative authority of
any other Federal agency. In addition to any other investigatory authority
they have with respect to violations of provisions of this chapter, the Attorney
General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, together with the Secretary,
shall have authority to conduct investigations with respect to violations of
subsection (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of section 844 of this title."
Among the several instances of campus bombings which gave rise to this provision
and which the Act is designed to prevent, uppermost in the minds of Senators and
Representatives was an incident which occurred at the University of Wisconsin on
August 24, 1970. On that occasion, a bomb, directed at a Department of Defensefunded mathematics research center, resulted in the death of a graduate student and the
destruction of an assemblage of cryogenic machinery representing a professor's life
work. During the course of the Senate debate on the House amendments to the Act,
Senator Paul J. Fannin (R-Ariz.) said: "The sooner we get tough with these terror-
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The penalties imposed under the antibombing provision vary
according to the degree of injury resulting from the explosion,
For malicious damage or destruction of property by means of an
explosive, the responsible person could receive a maximum fine of
$10,000 or imprisonment up to 10 years or both. If personal injury
results, the penalties may be doubled, and should death result, the
bomber would be subject to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or death5 1
Other prohibited activities include: the transportation or receipt
of, or the attempt to transport or receive, any explosive in commerce
with intent to kill, injure, or intimidate any individual, or to unlawfully damage or destroy any property; 5 the use of an explosive to
commit any felony which could be prosecuted in a court of the
United States;53 and the use of an instrument of commerce (including the mail, telephone, or telegraph) to willfully threaten another,
or to maliciously convey false information, knowing the same to be
false, in connection with an attempt to kill, injure, or intimidate any
individual, or to unlawfully damage or destroy any property by
means of an explosive.54
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 can be traced in many
substantive respects to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice and specifically to its Task
Force on Organized Crime. The original version of the Act,5 5 which
focused primarily upon organized crime and contained no provisions
respecting the unlawful use of explosives, was introduced in the
Senate on January 15, 1969. After consideration by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,5 the proposed act was passed by the Senate
by a vote of 73 to 1 on January 23, 1970, 57 and sent to the House

Committee on the Judiciary.
While the bill was being considered by the House Committee,
President Nixon issued a statement on March 25, 1970, calling for
ists, the sooner we can restore peace and security to our churches, our public buildings
and our campuses." 116 CONG. Rc. S17,776 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1970).

5118 U.S.C. § 844(f) (Supp. V,1970).
52Id. §

844(d):

531d. § 844(h) (1).
541d.§ 844(e).
55 S.30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
56
See S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
57116 CONG. REC. 972 (1970).
In addition, 22 absent Senators subsequently announced that, had they been present, they would have voted for passage; thus, a total
of 95 Senators supported the measure. See 116 CONG. REc. S17,773 (daily ed. Oct.
12, 1970).
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"extensive strengthening and expansion" of the federal laws relating
to the interstate transportation of explosivesY8 Warning that "frjecent months have brought an alarming increase in the number of
criminal bombings in the cities of our country," the President recommended, among other things, that the penalties for unlawful transportation or receipt in commerce of explosives be greatly stiffened
and that incendiary devices be brought within the purview of the
existing antibombing provisions. 9
In response to the President's recommendations, the House Committee inserted into the bill provisions that proscribed the use of,
or the possession with intent to use, explosives to damage or
destroy property owned by or leased to the federal government,
increased the existing federal penalties for unlawful use of explosives, and included incendiary devices within the category of explosives. 60
One week prior to the bill's reporting by the House Committee,
the President requested that further provisions be inserted to curb
the increasing incidence of bombings on college and university campuses. 6 The House Committee complied with the President's request and amended the bill to extend its penalties to anyone who
uses explosives to damage or attempt to damage property owned by
or leased to "any institution or organization receiving Federal financial assistance." The bill, as amended, was passed by the House on
October 7, 1970, 62 and was agreed to by the Senate on October 12,
1970.63

Insight into the Senate controversy surrounding the inclusion of
the provision relating to damage to institutions receiving federal
aid can be gained from a review of a Senate bill "4 to amend
58 116 CONG. REc. S17,502 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1970).
59 Id.
60 The President's recommendations of March 25, 1970, were reflected in bills in-

troduced in the House on March 26, 1970 [H.R. 16699 & H.R. 16700, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970)], and on July 21, 1970 [HR. 18573, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970)] by
several Republican members, many of whom served on the House Judiciary Committee. The proposals in those bills led to the committee's adding to S. 30 [91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969)] the provisions described in the text. See 116 CONG. Rnc. H9717
(daily ed. Oct. 7, 1970).
61 In his request to the House Judiciary Committee, the President said: "In dealing
with terror tactics in general and bombings in particular we must direct our attention
specifically to those outrageous acts that occur in the colleges and universities of America." 116 CONG. REC S17,501 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1970).
62 116 CoNG. REc_. H9779 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1970).
63 116 CONG. REc. S17,776 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1970).
64 S. 3650, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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the existing law respecting the use of explosives.6 5 That bill was
passed by the Senate on October 8, 1970,66 4 days prior to Senate
approval of the House version of the Organized Crime Control Act.
The bill was virtually identical to the provisions which the House
Judiciary Committee had added to the Organized Crime Control Act
in that the bill increased the penalties for unlawful use of explosives, added incendiary devices to the category of explosives, and
proscribed damage by means of explosives to property of the federal
government or "an institution or organization receiving Federal financial assistance." 7 The quoted language was inserted into the
bill by an amendment by Senator Roman Hruska (R-Neb.), the
bill's sponsor, with the intent "to broaden the coverage of the bill
principally to make malicious bombings on college campuses a Federal offense." 68
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D-N.C.), one of the original sponsors
of the Organized Crime Control Act, spoke in opposition to Senator
Hruska's floor amendment. His colloquy with Senators Hruska and
John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) capsulize the debate over the appropriateness (legal and otherwise) and efficacy of this type of legislation.
Senator Ervin made it clear that he "abhor[s] these bombings
....on the campuses of institutions of higher learning in this country," and, admitting that the Hruska amendment is not "necessarily"
unconstitutional, he conceded that "[i]t is hardly a lack of due process for Congress to regulate what it subsidizes." However, he said,
"The proposal to extend Federal jurisdiction solely upon the basis
that Federal funds have gone into these institutions or other activities is not justified." And he said: "I believe the function of punishing people for these crimes which are committed wholly within the
borders of the States is the function of State governments," and "I
think [the amendment] would be a long step toward the destruction
of the federal system of government, and the assumption by Congress of control over all the affairs of the States." Senator Ervin
concluded: "I am unwilling to have jurisdiction of riots perpetrated
on the college campuses given to the Federal Government, while
65 Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L No. 86-449, tit. II, § 203, 74 Stat. 87 (section
203 was codified in 18 U.S.C. § 837 (1964)).
66 116 CONG. REc S17,513 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1970).
67 Id.
68 Id. at S17,501.
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other riots on the public streets of a town are rightly left to the
' 69
jurisdiction of the States.
Senator Hruska then countered by saying that "the severity, volume, and the apparent pattern or scheme which has developed in
these bombings and dynamitings ....

are something with which the

country must come to grips."70 Senator McClellan agreed, adding the
observation that "crime, revolutionary tactics, anarchy, rebellion...
have reached such proportions in this country that it is imperative
that all forces, all legal instrumentalities that we can devise within
the framework of the Constitution need to be inaugurated and
brought into play against the forces that are creating this terroristic
condition in our society."'
Senator Ervin finished his unsuccessful
attempt to defeat the amendment with this admonition: "I recognize ...that we have a very critical situation with respect to activities of this nature on the campuses of our colleges, but . .
should not .... listen to the siren voice of necessity." 72
III.

.

. we

CAMPUS UNREST AND THE HIGHER EDUCATION
APPROPRIATION AND AUTHORIZATION ACTS

The principal legislative effort of Congress to eradicate campus
unrest is evidenced by provisions in various appropriation and authorization acts. These provisions deny assistance or compensation
otherwise available under federal programs to individuals (students,
instructors, other employees, and researchers) who have engaged in
various forms of campus disruption, and they occasionally deny assistance to the institution itself. A typical provision of this nature reads
as follows:
No part of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be used
to provide a loan, guarantee of a loan, a grant, the salary of, or
any remuneration whatever to any individual applying for admission, attending, employed by, teaching at or doing research at an
institution of higher education who has engaged in conduct ...
which involves the use of (or the assistance to others in the use of)
force or the threat of force of the seizure of property under the
control of an institution of higher education, to require or prevent
the availability of certain curriculum, or to prevent the faculty, ad4

o Id. at S17,503.

70 Id.
71 Id. at S17,504. Joseph Alsop had earlier predicted, somewhat by overstatement,
the culmination of this view: "If relevant, meaningful arson continues in the universities, the Congress is going to respond with almost unrestrained ferocity." Alsop, Hill
Reprisals on Universities Pose Grave Danger for Nation, Wash. Post, May 12, 1969, §
A, at 25.
72 116 CONG. REc S17,504 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1970).
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ministrative officials or students in such institution from engaging
in their duties or pursuing their studies at such institution.s

While this approach antedates the recently concluded 91st Congress, that it was widely accepted by that Congress is evidenced by
the 12 appropriation acts and five authorization acts containing antidisruption clauses which were passed during its first and second sessions.
The first enactment spedfically requiring denial of federal funds
in response to campus unrest came in 1968, in the 90th Congress.
In that instance, Congress decreed that the sanction should take the
form of a threatened cutoff of institutional funding by the federal
government.74 Thus, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Authorization Act for 196975 provided:
No part of the funds appropriated [for research and development' may be used for grants to any nonprofit institution of higher learning unless the Administrator or his designee determines at
the time of the grant that recruiting personnel of any of the Armed
Forces of the United States are not being barred from'the premises
or property of such institution except that this subsection shall not
apply if the Administrator or his designee determines that the
grant is a continuation or renewal of a previous grant to such institution which is likely to make a significant contribution to the
aeronautical and space activities of the United States.
Identical provisions have subsequently- been incorporated into the
73

Dept's of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1971, Act of Oct. 21, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-472, § 705, 84 Stat. 1064.
74
In June of 1969, a group of 22 House Republicans, led by then Representative
William B. Brock (R-Tenn.), embarked on a tour of American campuses, which culminat L in a report to the President 'on campus unrest, dated June 17, 1969. 115
CONG. REC. 17,409 (1969). The report contains "a series of ideas which [the Congressmen) believe merit urgent consideration," the first of which is. "no repressive legislation." They elaborated:
Any action by the Congress or others which would, for example, penalize
innocent and guilty alike by cutting off all aid to any institution which has
experienced difficulty would only serve to confirm the cry of the revolutionaries and compound the problem for each university. This holds, also, for
any action which would establish mediation or conciliation on the part of
the Federal government. In our opinion, the fundamental responsibility for
order and conduct on the campus lies with the university community. Id.
at 17,413.
7GAct of July 3, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-373, § I(h), 82 Stat. 281. This section
further provides:
The Secretary of Defense shall furnish to the Administrator or his designee
within sixty days after the date of enactment of this Act and each January
30 and June 30 thereafter the names of any nonprofit institutions of higher
learning which the Secretary of Defense determines on the date of each such
report are barring such recruiting personnel from premises or property of any
such institution.
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NASA authorization acts for 197076 and 1971, 7 7 and will undoubtedly continue to appear in future acts. Whereas the first enactments
were aimed at the institutions, the focus shifted to denial of federal
funds to individuals allegedly involved in fomenting campus unrest.
Initially, each individual institution of higher education bore the
responsibility for establishing the rules which were to be obeyed,
for determining whether a violation of such rules had taken place,
and for denying the payment of federal funds to the violator. The
first of such provisions appeared in the Independent Offices and Department of Housing and Urban Development Appropriation Act
for 19697s in a proviso to the portion of the Act appropriating
money for the National Science Foundation:
And provided further, That if an institution of higher education receiving funds hereunder determines after affording notice
and opportunity for hearing to an individual attending, or employed by, such institution, that such individual has, after the date
of enactment of this Act, willfully refused to obey a lawful regulation or order of such institution and that such refusal was of a
serious nature and contributed to the disruption of the administration of such institution, then the institution shall deny any further payment to, or for the benefit of, such individual. 79
Again, however, the emphasis shifted. Congress, guided by the
House Committee on Appropriations, ceased to rely solely upon institutional judgment in denying federal funds and began to require
that assistance be denied to individuals convicted in a court of law
for their involvement in campus disorder. The genesis of this approach appeared in the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act for 1969, ° which provided:
No part of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be used
to provide a loan, guarantee of a loan or a grant to any applicant
who has been convicted by any court of general jurisdiction of any
crime which involves the use of or the assistance to others in the
7

0National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, 1970, Act
of Nov. 18, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-119, § 1(h), 83 Star. 197.
77
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, 1971, Act
of July 2, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-303, § 1 (h), 84 Stat. 375.
78
Act of Oct. 4, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-550, 82 Star. 937.
791d. at 946. The proviso was formulated by the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, although a similar version was adopted in the House in a floor amendment offered by Representative Louis C. Wyman (R-N.H.), 114 CONG. REC. 12,252
(1968).
80
Act of Oct. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-557, § 411, 82 Star. 995. In some states,
students who have participated in campus disturbances are tried under county ordinances.
A conviction under such an ordinance is not a conviction of a "crime" under state law
and thus would not disqualify a student for aid under section 411.
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use of force, trespass or the seizure of property under control of
an institution of higher education to prevent officials or students at
such an institution from engaging in their duties or pursuing their
studies.
But of greater significance than the above-quoted provision
is section 504 of the Higher Education Amendments of 1968,81
which, with its increased scope and relative clarity, provided a model
for many subsequent enactments. Section 504 is designed to deny
federal funds under various individual assistance programs82 to both
fomenters of campus unrest and perpetrators of campus violence.
To effect this purpose, the provision combines both of the approaches
discussed above: that is, either a criminal conviction or an institutional determination of wrongdoing can result in a denial of federal
assistance. Sections 504(a) and (b) read as follows:
(a) If an institution of higher education determines, after
affording notice and opportunity for hearing to an individual attending, or employed by, such institution, that such individual has
been convicted by any court of record of any crime which was com.
mitted after [the date of enactment of this Act] and which involved the use of (or assistance to others in the use of) force,
disruption, or the seizure of property under control of any institution of higher education to prevent officials or students in such institution from engaging in their duties or pursuing their studies,
and that such crime was of a serious nature and contributed to a
substantial disruption of the administration of the institution with
respect to which such crime was committed, then the institution
which such individual attends, or is employed by, shall deny for a
period of two years any further payment to, or for the direct benefit of, such individual under any of the programs specified in subsection (c) of this section. If an institution denies an individual
assistance under the authority of the preceding sentence of this subsection, then any institution which such individual subsequently
attends shall deny for the remainder of the two-year period any
further payment to, or for the direct benefit of, such individual
under any of the programs specified in subsection (c) of this section.
(b) If an institution of higher education determines, after
affording notice and opportunity for hearing to an individual attending, or employed by, such institution, that such individual has
willfully refused to obey a lawful regulation or order of such institution after [the date of enactment of this Act], and that such
refusal was of a serious nature and contributed to a substantial disruption of the administration of such institution, then such institution shall deny, for a period of two years, any further payment to,
8120

U.S.C. § 1060 (Supp. V, 1970).
The programs are enumerated in section 504(c) of the Higher Education Amendments of 1968, 20 U.S.C. § 1060(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
82
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or for the direct benefit of, such individual under any of the programs specified in subsection (c) of this section.83
In addition, section 504(d) broadens the scope of the sanction by
providing:
(1) Nothing in this Act, or any Act amended by this Act,
shall be construed to prohibit any institution of higher education
from refusing to award, continue, or extend any financial assistance
under any such Act to any individual because of any misconduct
which in its judgment bears adversely on his fitness for such assistance.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting or
prejudicing the rights and prerogatives of any institution of higher
education to institute and carry out an independent, disciplinary
s4
proceeding pursuant to existing authority, practice, and law.
Administratively, it is difficult to terminate aid under sections
504(a) and (b). Under section 504(a) the institution, in addition to providing for a hearing, must find that the individual's conduct meets five tests: (1) the conduct must be such as to warrant
court conviction for commission of a "crime"; (2) the "crime" must

involve "the use of (or assistance to others in the use of) force, disruption, or the seizure of property under control of any institution
of higher education"; (3) the conduct must "prevent officials or
students in such institution from engaging in their duties or pursuing
their studies"; (4) the "crime" must be "of a serious nature"; and
(5) the "crime" must "contribute to a substantial disruption of the
administration of the institution with respect to which such crime
'
was committed." 85
Many institutions which have experienced campus unrest have not witnessed conduct which meets all five tests under section 504(a). Likewise, to have assistance terminated under
section 504(b), an individual must engage in conduct meeting three
tests: (1) he or she must have "willfully refused to obey a lawful
regulation or order of [the] institution"; (2) such refusal must have
been "serious"; and (3) it must have "contributed to a substantial
disruption of the administration of [the] institution."85 These requirements under sections 504(a) and 504(b) pose a significant
burden for the institution desiring to penalize an individual involved
in campus disruptions, and they at the same time afford an institution the opportunity to frustrate Congress' intended sanction by
83d.§§

1060(a)-(b).

841d. §§ 1060(d) (1)-(2).
851d. § 1060(a).
861d. § 1060(b).
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finding that an individual's otherwise disruptive conduct does not
meet all of the requirements for a denial of federal assistance.
In addition to its applicability to several federal assistance programs and its use of determinations by both institutions and local
courts respecting an individual's conduct, section 504 is also noteworthy as the first campus unrest rider to recognize that many activities associated with campus unrest involve constitutionally-protected individual dissent. This fact is recognized in section
504(d)(3), which states "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit the freedom of any student to verbal expression of
87
individual views or opinions.
Congress concluded its 1968 efforts to curb campus unrest through
denying federal assistance by writing into the Department of Defense Appropriation Act for 19698 a provision which was identical
to the one inserted in the fiscal year 1969 appropriation measure for
the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare."'
Thus, despite a House rule prohibiting legislation in appropriation bills,90 during 1968 Congress enacted three regular appropriation
measures91 and two authorization acts containing specific provisions
aimed at curbing campus unrest. Use of such legislative riders however, was not confined to campus unrest clauses; Congress - prindpally the House of Representatives - used them to achieve desired goals in other areas. For example, in 1968 the 90th Congress
added the following provision to the Public Works for Water and
Power Resources Development and Atomic Energy Commission Appropriation Act for 196992 (Public Works Appropriation Act for
1969):
No part of any appropriation herein shall be used to confer a
fellowship on any person who advocates or who is a member of
an organization or party that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or "with respect
to whom the Commission finds, upon investigation and report by
87Id.

88Act
89Act

§ 1060(d) (3).

of Oct 17, 1968, Pub. L No. 90-580, § 640, 82 Stat. 1136.
of Oct 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-557, § 411, 82 Star. 995; see text accom-

panying note 80 supra.
90

RuLEs OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Rule XXI, § 843 (90th Cong.).
addition to regular appropriation acts (of which 13 were enacted in 1968)
which authorize funds for the various departments and agencies of the federal government, the Congress also enacts supplemental appropriation acts (to fund agencies or
programs not covered in a regular appropriation act) and continuing appropriation acts
(to continue funding at an established level when a regular appropriation act expires
prior to the enactment of its successor).
92 Act of Aug. 12, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-479, 82 Star. 705.
91

Ia
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the Civil Service Commission on the character, associations, and
such
loyalty of whom, that reasonable grounds exist for belief that
93
person is disloyal to the Government of the United States.

The above provision focuses on the politicization of the campus
rather than on campus violence and disruptions. And the Public
Works Appropriation Act for 1969 and other acts contained additional provisions that could be used to stem the growing politicization

of the higher education community. These provisions were designed
to prohibit lobbying efforts underwritten by federal appropriations.
Thus, in addition to the above-quoted provision, the Public Works
Appropriation Act for 1969 contained the following language: "No
part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act, or of
the funds available for expenditure by any corporation or agency,
shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes designed to sup94
port or defeat legislation pending before Congress.1
931d. at 716.

This provision continues:
Provided, That any person who advocates or who is a member of an organization or party that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United
States by force or violence and accepts employment or a fellowship the salary,
wages, stipend, grant, or expenses for which are paid from any appropriation
contained herein shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or
both: Provided further, That the above penal clause shall be in addition to,
and not in substitution for any other provisions of existing law.
Identical provisions appear in the Public Works for Water, Pollution Control, and
Power Development and Atomic Energy Commission Appropriation Act for 1970 [Act
of Dec. 11, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-144, 83 Stat. 324-25] and 1971 [Act of Ocr. 7, 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-439, 84 Stat. 8911.
Still more general provisions were inserted in some of the other appropriation acts
in 1968. For example, the Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriation Act for 1969 [Act of Aug. 8, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-463, § 509, 82 Star. 6531
contained the following provision:
No part of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be used to pay salaries
of any Federal employee who is convicted in any Federal, State, or local court
of competent jurisdiction, of inciting, promoting, or carrying on a riot, or
any group activity resulting in material damage to property or injury to persons, found to be in violation of Federal, State, or local laws designed to
protect persons or property in the community concerned.
Somewhat similar provisions appear in the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act for 1969 [Act of Aug.
9, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-470, § 705, 82 Star. 692]; the Department of the Interior and
Related Agencies Appropriation Act for 1969 [Act of July 26, 1968, Pub. L No. 90425, § 303, 82 Stat. 445]; the Independent Offices and Department of Housing and
Urban Development Act for 1969 [Act of Oct. 4, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-550, § 308, 82
Stat. 957]; and the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act for 1969 [Act of Oct. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-557, § 411, 82 Star.
995].
94 Act of Aug. 12, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-479, § 508, 82 Star. 718. The Independent
Offices [including the National Science Foundation] and Department of Housing and
Urban Development Appropriation Act for 1969 [Act of Oct. 4, 1968, Pub. L No.
90-500, § 301, 82 Stat. 956] contained language nearly identical to that quoted from
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By the end of the second session of -the 90th Congress -six of
the 13 regular appropriation acts contained provisions designed to
curb campus unrest either by denying federal aid to individuals engaging in violent or disruptive conduct, or by proscribing the use of
federal funds to support "political" activism.
As campus unrest became more widespread, notably in the academic years 1968-1969" and 1969-1970, Congress continued to utilize such provisions in appropriation and authorization acts to assure
constituents that "something was being done," and to enable those
Congressmen especially displeased with campus unrest to vent their
anger. 'Accordingly, early in the first session of the 91st Congress,
the following amendment, in the form of a proviso, accompanied
the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act for 1969:
Provided further, That none of the funds appropriated by this
Act for annual interest grants authorized by section 306 of the'
Higher Education Facilities Act, as amended by Public Law 90-575,
shall be used to formulate or carry out any grant to any institution
of higher education unless such institution is in full compliance
with section 504 of such Act. 6
The 91st Congress' concern over campus unrest, as initially
evinced by the above amendment, is similarily reflected throughout
the appropriation process of that Congress. Of the appropriation
acts passed by the 91st Congress, five regular appropriations (out
of 13) in the first session - plus the above supplemental appropriations act for fiscal year 1969 - and six (out of 14) from the second session contained provisions designed to reduce campus unrest.
Most of the provisions of the regular appropriation acts approved
by the 91st Congress during its first session were the same as the
provisions written by the 90th Congress. These reenactments included the proscriptive sections of the Independent Offices [including
the Public Works Appropriation Act for 1969. And the Departments of State, Justice,
and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act for 1969 [Act
of Aug. 9, 1968, Pub. L No. 90-470, § 701, 82 Stat 691) similarly stated that "[nio
part of any appropriation contained in this Act shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes not authorized by the Congress."
05
See Bayer & Astin, supra note 11, at 337.
9 Act of July 22, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-47, 83 Stat. 57. Before the House vote on
this measure, an aide to Representative William J. Scherle (R-Iowa), the bill's sponsor,
was quoted as saying that "[ajll this [bill] does is put the colleges and universities on
notice that Congress is reflecting the people, and is getting pretty tired of these guys
[university officials] wishy-washing around." Wash. Post, May 20, 1969, § A, at 2.
See text accompanying notes 81-87 supra for a discussion of the provisions of section 504 of the Higher Education Amendments of 1968, 20 U.S.C. § 1060 (Supp. V,
1970).
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the National Science Foundationj and Department of Housing and
Urban Development Appropriation Act for 1970; 97 the Public
Works for Water, Pollution Control, and Power Development and
Atomic Energy Commission Appropriation Act for 1970;8 the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriation Act for 1970;" 9 and the Department of Defense Appropriation Act for 1970.100

The only two basic changes appearing in the fiscal year 1970
appropriation acts passed by the 91st Congress were effected during the second session. The first appeared in the Departments of
Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare, and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act for 1970.01 The provision,'0 2 which is identical
to that quoted at the outset of this section of the article,0 3 contains
language which is typical of that adopted during the second session of the 91st Congress to curb campus unrest. The 1970 proscription appears to eliminate the requirement of a criminal conviction, thus avoiding some of the administrative difficulties presented
by its 1969 predecessor. 10 4
97

Act of Nov. 26, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-126, §§ 404, 411, 83 Stat. 243, 244.
Act of Dec. 11, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-144, §§ 102, 508, 83 Stat. 324-25, 338.
9
Act of Dec. 24, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-153, §§ 701, 705, 83 Star. 426, 427.
100 Act of Dec. 29, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-17 1, §§ 601, 640, 83 Stat. 479, 486. In
addition, the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act for
1970 [Act of Oct. 29, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-98, § 303, 83 Star. 166] and the Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriation Act for 1970 [Act of Nov.
26, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-127, § 509, 83 Stat. 261] contained sections prohibiting the
payment of salaries of. federal employees convicted of engaging in illegal riotous activity. Likewise, the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act for
1970 (Act of Feb. 9, 1970, Pub. L No. 91-194, 84 Stat. 13] contained the provision
banning appropriations for unauthorized publicity or propaganda purposes.
101 Act of March 5, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-204, 84 Stat. 23.
lo2Id. § 407, at 48.
103 See text accompanying note 73 supra.
0 4
' See note 80 supra & accompanying text.
An earlier version of the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 1970 [H.R. 13111, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969)), which was ultimately vetoed as being inflationary and misdirected,
contained - as reported by the House Committee on Appropriations - a much stronger
provision:
No part of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be used to provide a
loan, guarantee of a loan, a grant, the salary of or any renumeration whatever
to any individual applying for admisson, attending, employed by, teaching at,
or doing research at an institution of higher education who has engaged in
conduct on or after October 13, 1968, which involves the use of (or the assistance to others in the use of) force or threat of force or the seizure of
property under the control of an institution of higher education, to require
or prevent the availability of certain curriculum, or to prevent the faculty,
administrative officials, or students in such institution from engaging in their
duties or pursuing their studies at such institution:
98
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The other change in a fiscal year 1970 appropriation act came
in the form of new section 706 of the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act for 1970.105

The basic language of the campus unrest pro-

vision in section 706 is amplified by two provisos, which read as
follows:
Provided,That such limitation upon the use of money appropriated
in this Act shall not apply to a particular individual until the appropriate institution of higher education at which such conduct occurred shall have had an opportunity to initiate or has completed
such proceedings as it deems appropriate but which are not dilatory
in order to determine whether the provisions of this limitation
upon the use of appropriated funds shall apply: Provided further,
That such institution shall certify to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare at quarterly or semester intervals that it is in
compliance with this provision. The 91st Congress' concern over campus unrest was also reflected
in the July 1969 enactment of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Authorization Act for 19 7 0.1
In addition to the
provision carried forward from the 1969 version which denied research and development grants to institutions of higher education

Provided Further,That none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be
used to formulate or carry out any grant or loan or interest subsidy to any
institution of higher education other than to such institutions certifying to
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare at quarterly or semester intervals that they are in compliance with this provision.
This provision would have required an institution of higher education to certify with
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that it had withdrawn federal financial assistance from students or faculty members who had engaged in campus disruptions. Failure to submit such certification would have caused the delinquent college
or university to forfeit federal grants, loans, and interest subsidies. Because of its strict
enforcement provisions and its broad coverage of the educational community, the measure was the strongest campus unrest proposal to reach the House floor. This fact
was evidenced in a letter to the late Senator Everett M. Dirksen on July 17, 1969, in
which Attorney General John N. Mitchell and then-Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, Robert H. Finch, wrote:
We realize that Congress is rightly concerned with the situation on college
and university campuses. ... In our studied judgment, however, such [fund
cutoff) legislation would be counter-productive, and would seriously jeopardize the relationship between the academic community and the Federal government which has been of such inestimable benefit to our society. 115
CONG. REc. 39,551 (1969).
The provision was deleted on a point of order during House debate. 115 CONG. REC.
21,631 (1969). The point of order was that the provision constituted legislation in
an appropriations bill, which is forbidden by House rules. RULES OF Tm HousE OF
REPREsENTATiVus, Rule XXI, § 843 (91st Cong.).
105 Act of Dec. 24, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-153, § 706, 83 Star. 427.
10 6 Act of Nov. 18, 1969, Pub. L No. 91-119, 83 Stat. 196.
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where Armed Forces recruiting personnel are banned,' the 1970
Act contained new provisions denying individual assistance under
terms and conditions identical to those inserted in the Higher Education Amendments of 1968.108
During the year 1970 and the early weeks of 1971, when the
appropriation acts for fiscal year 1971 were passed, the 91st Congress
adhered to the now established pattern of inserting campus unrest
provisions therein. As in the previous year, many of the enactments
restated prior years' provisions. 10 9 In the new Office of Education
Appropriation Act for 1971,110 Congress included the now-standard

campus unrest provision:
No part of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be used
to provide a loan, guarantee of a loan, a grant, the salary of or any
remuneration whatever to any individual applying for admission,
attending, employed by, teaching at, or doing research at an institution of higher education who has engaged in conduct.., which
involves the use of (or the assistance to others in the use of) force
or the threat of force or the seizure of property under the control
of an institution of higher education, to require or prevent the
availability of certain curriculum, or to prevent the faculty, administrative officials, or students in such institution from engaging in
their duties or pursuing their studies at such institution."'

As the foregoing amply illustrates, recent Congresses have been
quite prolific in attempting to curb campus unrest through the denial
of federal support to institutions or individuals charged with condoning or fomenting campus violence or disruptions. But despite
See text accompanying note 75 supra.
o See text accompanying note 81-87 supra.
109 E.g., Public Works for Water, Pollution Control, and Power Development and
Atomic Energy Commission Appropriation Act, 1971, Act of Oct. 7, 1970, Pub. L No.
91-439, 84 Stat. 891, 903; Departments of State, Justice and Commerce, the Judiciary.
and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1971, Act of Oct. 21, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91472, 84 Stat. 1064; Independent Offices [including the National Science Foundation)
and Department of Housing and Urban Development Appropriation Act, 1971, Act of
Dec. 17, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-556, 84 Stat. 1450, 1463, 1464; Departments of Labor,
and Health, Education, and Welfare, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1971,
Act of Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-667, 84 Stat. 2019; Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1971, Act of Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-668, 84 Stat. 2029.
110 Act of Aug. 18, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-380, 84 Stat. 800. In prior fiscal years,
appropriations for the Office of Education were enacted as part of the funding for the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
111 Id. at 804. Moreover, the National Science Foundation Authorization Act of
1971 [Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-356, 84 Star. 471] bears the same provisions as its predecessor [Act of Nov. 18, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-120, 83 Star. 203].
Also, the Armed Forces Appropriations Authorization Act for 1971 [Act of Oct. 7,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-441, 84 Star. 914] contains a provision forbidding the use of
funds at institutions of higher learning which bar recruiting personnel from the campus,
unless the grant is likely to make a significant contribution to national defense.
107

1 8
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Congress' efforts, the effectiveness of these provisions and Congress'
ability to enlist the institutions' cooperation in enforcing them remain matters of considerable question.
It was in the latter context that Representative Edith Green (DOre.), Chairman of the Special Education Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, speaking before the House on
September 23, 1970,112 chastized most colleges and universities for
disregarding the requirements of these provisions or otherwise acting
in bad faith. She brandished a report compiled by the U.S. Office
of Education showing that, during fiscal year 1970, 440 students
had been the subject of college and university action taken in compliance or conjunction with the legislation passed by the Congress
to terminate federal funds to students or faculty members who participate in a riot or other disruptive campus activities. Representative Green stated that "lilt appears too many institutions of higher
education have not taken the law seriously." She was highly distressed with the report's findings that during the fiscal year only three
institutions of higher education terminated assistance to students
(24) pursuant to the requirements of the Departments of Labor,
and Health, Education, and Welfare, and Related Agencies Appropriation Acts for 19691 and 1970.14 She was further aggravated
by the finding that only six institutions reported terminations of aid
to students (16) under sections 504(a) and (b) of the Higher Education Amendments of 1968.115 Finally, she was disturbed to report
that only 76 institutions effected terminations (400) in conjunction
with Section 504(d) (1) of the 1968 Amendments.1 1 6
Representative Green's displeasure was nurtured not only by the
foregoing statistics, but also by the fact that most of the institutions
reporting were small colleges, rather than, she said, the "major
institutions of higher education in this country . . . . [which] have
experienced major disturbances of the sort that the Federal legislation was designed to reach."" 7 For example, of the 24 reported
terminations under the two appropriation acts mentioned above, 20
were made by the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
and nine of the 16 students that were terminated in accordance with
sections 504 (a) and (b) of the 1968 amendments were enrolled at
112

116 CONG. REc. H9138-40 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1970).

113 Act of Oct. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-557, § 411, 82 Stat. 995.

114 Act of March 5, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-204, 84 Stat. 23.

1520 U.S.C. §§ 1060(a)-(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
11620 U.S.C. § 1060(d) (1) (Supp. V, 1970).
117 116 CONG. REc H9139 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1970).
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Miami University of Ohio. Representative Green observed that
"the universities which have most distinguished themselves by violence by their students and faculty members are conspicuous by their
11 8
absence on the list.
Aside from questions raised by the Office of Education's survey
such as the degree of institutional cooperation and the accuracy
of the survey itself"' - other questions pertaining to the effectiveness and utility of the campus unrest provisions persist. Representative John E.Moss (D-Cal.), during the course of the debate on
an abortive Department of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 1970,120 offered as
advice to his colleagues his opinion that
we [the Housel can kid ourselves that adopting something like
[campus unrest ridersl is going to cure basic problems, but it is
not. We can write stronger and stronger and stronger laws, and
it is not going to cure the underlying causes which are really symptomized by the unrest on the campuses. 121
Even those who seriously advocate the provisions, such as Representative Green, admit that they appear to be generating few results at
the principal institutions of higher education.
The reasons for the undramatic showing on the part of most
institutions in effecting terminations are manifold: 22 (1) many individuals engaged in disruptive on-campus activity were not college
or university students; (2) most of the students involved in disruptive activity have not enjoyed federal financial assistance; (3) many
students engaging in disruptive activity failed to commit an act proscribed by the provisions; (4) some students had already received
federal assistance antecedent to their hearing, thereby precluding termination; (5) some institutions either expelled or suspended students who committed serious disruptive acts, making termination
of aid a moot sanction; and (6) many institutions have instituted
extensive hearing procedures and processes for publicizing the exis11lId.
119 It is possible, for example, that universities view nearly all of their terminations
of federal assistance to students as falling under section 504(d) (1) if an infraction of
the university's rules is involved.
20
1 H.R. 13111, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
121 115 CONG. REc. 21,636 (1969).
Representing a contrary view, Representative William J. Scherle (R-Iowa) said: "I cannot for the life of me understand why
the taxpayers of this country should be forced to finance the destruction and the disruption of our Nation's campuses." Id. at 21,634.
122 These reasons have been digested from surveys and compilations made by the
Association of American Universities.
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tence of these provisions and the consequences of violating them,
thus perhaps extending to the provisions a certain prophylactic effect.l2
For institutions of higher education, the problem generated by
campus unrest provisions is largely one of aggravation - a combination of questions of interpretation and difficulties of administration.' 24 And more importantly, these provisions have not, for reasons
noted earlier, deterred campus unrest to any significant degree and
25
may in fact have exacerbated it.
For students, faculty members, and others adversely affected by
these provisions, more fundamental problems are presented, often
generating constitutional issues of substantive and procedural due
process.'2 6 Within the framework of substantive requirements lie
the following questions: Are the provisions unconstitutionally vague,
that is, are they explicit enough to inform those subject to them what
conduct will render them liable to the penalties?1 2' Do such provisions have a chilling effect on constitutionally protected dissent?"8
Do they broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties despite a legitimate and substantial governmental purpose?"O Moreover, the
provisions may be offensive to judicially developed concepts of academic freedom.""
From a purely administrative standpoint, a single federal statute
imposing conditions on federal assistance to students, faculty, and
even institutions would be considerably preferable to a host of differing, overlapping provisions adorning various appropriation and
authorization acts. As one commentator wrote, "[t]he current un12 3 For a survey of "positive steps" taken by state and land-grant universities to involve students and curtail campus disruptions, see CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGES To EASE
CAMPUS TENSIONS (comp. by Office of Institutional Research, National Ass'n of State

Universities and Land-Grant Colleges 1970).
124 See Comment, Federal Aid to Education: Campus-Unrest Riders, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1094, 1101-03 (1970). See generally Willingham, Capitol Hill and Colleges
Debate Value of Student Unrest Laws, 2 NAT'L J. 2713 (1970).
125 See Comment, supra note 124, at 1105-07.
2 6
'
See generally Comment, Higher Education and the Student Unrest Provisions,
31 OHio ST.LJ.111 (1970).
127 See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926); Note, The
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine In The Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.L. REV. 67 (1960).
128 Ct. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S.479, 487 (1965); Schwartz, The Student,
The University and the First Amendment, 31 OHio ST. L.J. 635 (1970).
12See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S.479, 488 (1960).
0
'3 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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rest riders are at best a cumbersome and ineffective way of dealing
1 31
with campus unrest."'
A more practical and effective approach would be to leave the
administration of campuses to the institutions involved, assisted by
state and local authorities in extreme situations. This - would relieve the federal government of the temptation to regulate in an
area where its principal competence is to subsidize. In other words,
Congress should revert to the policy enunciated in the Higher Education Act of 1965:
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize any
department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to
exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the curriculum,
program of instruction, 3administration,
or personnel of any educational institution .... 2
As the statutory authorization for the major programs by which
the federal government contributes support to higher education involving annual outlays of several billion dollars - expires at the
close of the current fiscal year (June 30, 1971), an analysis of the
effectiveness of campus unrest provisions in appropriation and authorization acts is appropriate. Most of these programs will be extended and some new ones will be inaugurated. As the legislation for
these programs wends its way toward enactment, considerable pressure will be brought at numerous points along the legislative process
to insert strong language denying federal assistance to individuals
participating in (and perhaps to institutions that are condoning or not
preventing) disruptive campus activity. 3 Indeed, it was the specter of repressive and unadministerable provisions being inserted in
extension legislation which kept a higher education bill bottled up
in the House Committee on Education and Labor in the 91st Congress. 3
Before the 92nd Congress begins enacting campus unrest
131 Comment, supra note 124, at 1107.
132 Act of Nov. 8, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 804(a), 79 Star. 1270. See also
Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, Act of Dec. 16, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-204, §
407, 77 Stat. 379.
153 Joseph Kraft wrote that "once [campus unrest] legislation gets on the floor of
the Congress, it will be worked over by the know-nothing demogogues in a way sure
to do harm to the spirit of university life." Kraft, Vast Progress Is Being Made In
Cooling Off the Campus, Wash. Post, June 10, 1969, § A, at 19.
134 Early in 1970, Representative Edith Green (D-Ore.) readied an omnibus bill
(H.R. 16098, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)) which would have extended the authorization for existing federal aid to higher education programs and added some major innovations. The bill was the subject of hearings before the House Special Subcommittee
on Education, which initially planned to report the measure by May 1, 1970. See Wash.
Post, Jan. 12, 1970, § A, at 2. But by the congressional summer recess, the subcommittee had agreed to finalize an alternative bill (H.R. 18849, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
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riders, it would be well advised to thoroughly explore the consequences, in terms of enforcability and productivity, of so doing.
IV.

CAMPUS UNREST AND THE FEDERAL TAX

STATUS OF INSTITUTIONS

OF HIGHER EDUCATION

In May of 1970, officials of the United States Departments of
Justice and the Treasury startled representatives of the higher education community with suggestions that the increasing politicization of the campus, resulting from activities of students, faculty,
and others might be endangering the federal tax status of colleges
and universities, 35 and, moreover, might be causing institutions
of higher education that participate in or sanction such activities to violate the Federal Corrupt Practices Act.' These intimations generated
considerable alarm throughout the higher education community, which
immediately sought to ward off administrative responses from the
federal government to campus unrest 3 7 by countering with a package of guidelines to be observed by colleges and universities in their
efforts to preserve their federal tax status (and secondarily to avoid
(1970)) which essentially would have extended the existing programs for 3 years.
The deadlock continued - principally because of the issue of campus unrest - throughout the second session of the 91st Congress, which adjourned without consideration of
a higher education bill, thus perpetuating the matter as a legacy for the 92nd Congress.
See THE WASi-L STATUS REP. No. 3, at 11 (1970) and No. 8, at 3 (1970).
Representative Green wrote:
Those connected with higher education and members of the Congress are
compelled to ponder the critical funding problem, or loss of tax support,
which may result from the reaction to the violent actions of this small minority
on our campuses. The House Special Subcommittee on Education recently
[July 1, 1969] agreed that it would be most unwise to try to bring to the
floor this year a bill on higher education because campus violence had made
the climate so unfavorable.
She added: "Wanton destruction by the beneficiaries of higher education does not make
it easy to plead in committee, on the House floor, or before tax-paying constituents for
more funds for higher education." Green, A Congresswoman's Warning, 51 EDUCATIONAL REcORD 222, 223 (1970).
13 5 See Wall Street J., June 18, 1970, at 10, col. 1. "The [Federal] Government
has warned colleges and universities to proceed carefully in encouraging their students
and faculties to work in this fall's [1970] campaigns." Id.
130 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1964). The issues involving the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act are discussed in full in section V infra.
137 The tax status of a college or university under local law may also be jeopardized
by incidents of campus activism. For example, New Haven, Connecticut, on Sept.
20, 1970, announced it would assess, for real property tax purposes, 11 parcels of
property owned by Yale University on the ground that the property is not being used
exclusively for educational purposes. Wash. Post, Sept. 21, 1970, § A, at 7. Similarly,
Time Magazine reported that, in Waltham, Massachusetts, home of Brandeis University,
the local board of assessors "threatened" the university with a $10,000 tax assessment
for a building used by a student-run strike information center. The group subsequently
left the campus. TIMB, Aug. 3, 1970, at 32.
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prosecution under the Corrupt Practices Act). The guidelines," 8"
issued on June 19, 1970, were denominated "fair and reasonable"
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. " '
Private institutions of higher education derive exemption from
federal income taxation under section 501 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (Code), pursuant to section 501 (c) (3) of the Code. 4 '
In addition, contributions made to such organizations are deductible
by the donors for income, 4 ' estate, 1 2 and gift 43 tax purposes.
Organizations described in section 501(c)(3) and the contributions
deduction sections are deemed to meet four basic criteria: (1) they
must be "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
144
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educationalpurposes,
or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals"; (2) "no part
of the net earnings" of such organizations may inure "to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual"; (3) "no substantial part of
the activities" of such organizations may constitute "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation"; and (4)
such organizations must "not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office."' 45
The federal government stressed the fourth criterion of section
501(c) (3) and the contributions deduction sections, and to some extent the third, in questioning the effect of campus political activities
138 AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION GUIDELINES (June

21, 1970), exerpted

in, 4 CCH 1971 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5 3033.197.
139 4 CCH 1971 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5 3033.197. Presumably, these guidelines,
unlike the guidelines announced by the Internal Revenue Service with respect to public
interest groups engaged in litigation [7 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5 6943G),
which were promulgated, rather than merely approved, by the Service, have no legal
efficacy; nonetheless, prudence dictates adherence to them.
140 State colleges and universities generally base their exemption on section 115 (a)
of the Code which excludes the income of state instrumentalities from the Code definition of gross income. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61 [hereinafter cited as CODE).
141Id. § 170(c) (2).
142Id. § 2055 (a) (2).
143 Id. § 2522(a) (2).
144 The term "educational" in this context relates to the "instruction or training of

the individual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities" or the "instruction of the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (3) (1959). And the Supreme Court has
held that the requirement that "an organization must be devoted to educational purposes
exclusively.... plainly means that the presence of a single noneducational purpose, if
substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance
of truly educational purposes." Better Business Bureau of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. United
States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
145 CODE § 501 (c) (3); sections cited notes 141-43 supra (emphasis added).
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on the tax status of colleges and universities. The third criterion,
which generally limits the legislative activities of charitable and educational institutions, was appended to the Revenue Act of 1934148 without any request being made therefor by the Treasury Department.14 7
As originally drafted, this provision would have denied exemption to
institutions that participated in partisan politics or substantial legislative activities. When the bill reached the Senate floor for debate, it
was apparent that the amendment was intended, as expressed by its
sponsor, Senator David A. Reed, to curb a specific maverick organization known as the National Economy League. During debate, Senator
Reed made it clear that he did not wish to affect the legislative activities of "any of the worthy institutions.' '14 After modification by
the House-Senate Conference Committee, the amendment became law
in its present form.
The fourth criterion, which proscribes participation or intervention in a political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public
office, has a remarkably similar origin. It was added, during Senate
debate, as a floor amendment offered by then-Senator Lyndon B.
Johnson to the bill which subsequently became the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.149 Although there is nothing in the record, it is
understood that Senator Johnson's proposal was made to curb the
activities of a private foundation in Texas that he believed had provided indirect financial support to his opponent in a recent election. 150
The prohibition against an exempt institution's involving itself in
a political campaign is generally supposed to be absolute, although
the legislative history provides no clarification. The regulations accompanying section 501(c) (3) likewise provide no illumination;
they basically track only the language of the statute.' 5 '
' 46 Ch. 277, § 101(6), 48 Star. 700.
14778 CONG. REC. 5861, 7831 (1934).

For an interesting discussion of the ori-

gins of this provision, see Lehrfeld, The Taxation of Ideology, 19 CATHOLIC U.L.

REv.

50 (1969).
14878 CONG. REc. 5861 (1934).
3.49 H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
15 0 See 100 CONG. REc. 9604 (1954). The Senate Finance Committee, without
particular comment in its report IS. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)],
added a similar limitation to the estate and gift tax charitable contributions deductions
sections in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 201(a), (d) (4), 83
Star. 487 (CODE §§ 2055 (a) (2), 2522(a) (2)).
151 The regulations state that "[a]ctivities which constitute participation or intervention in a political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate include,
but are not limited to, the publication or distribution of written or printed statements
or the making of oral statements on behalf of or in opposition to such candidate."
Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (a) (3)-1(c) (3) (iii) (1959).
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Since enactment of this fourth criterion, only the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has expanded on the nature of the prohibition of political involvement; but the court did so only within
the context of prohibited legislative activities under the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code.' 52 In Seasongood v. Commissioner,' the sixth circuit, in allowing the deductibility of charitable contributions to the
Hamilton County Good Government League (an organization exempt from tax as charitable or educational), found that although
the league engaged in "political activities," such activities were "insubstantial" in relation to its other activities, and hence not grounds
for denial of the deductibility of the contributions. The league
endorsed candidates for political office and sponsored or opposed
legislation through contacts with legislative officials. Finding that
"something less than 5% of the time and effort of the League was
devoted to "political activities," the court concluded that "the socalled 'political activities' of the League were not, in relation to all
of its other activities, substantial within the meaning of the section.'154
The Seasongood decision, however, should by no means be interpreted to mean that an educational organization may participate or
intervene in a political campaign on behalf of a candidate and not
run afoul of the fourth criterion of section 501(c) (3) solely because such political activities are "insubstantial." The language of
section 501(c) (3) with respect to campaign intervention or participation does not contain qualifying language - as does the third
criterion concerning legislative activities - and is, as noted above,
generally considered an absolute prohibition.' 55
152

INT. REV. CODE OF 1939

§

101 (6).

153 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).

154 Id. at 912.
155 The absoluteness of this fourth requirement, however, has never been directly
pronounced upon by the federal judiciary. Indirect pronouncements have spawned
theories of why an exception of insubstantiality might be engrafted by the courts on the
prohibition on campaign involvement. Despite the express requirement of section
501 (c) (3) of the Code that colleges and universities exempt thereunder be "operated
. . educational purposes," both the regulations [Treas. Reg. §
exclusively for.
1.501(c) (3)-1(c) (1) (1959)], and the cases [St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United
States, 374 F.2d 427, 431 (9th Cir. 1967); Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d
907, 910 (6th Cit. 1955)] indicate that an institution need only be operated primarily
for such purposes. Cf. Estate of Anita McCormick Blaine, 22 T.C. 1195 (1954) (The
Tax Court disallowed charitable contributions to the Foundation for World Government on the grounds that it was not organized and operated exclusively for educational
purposes. The foundation's sole benefactor's interests "went beyond any mere academic
or educational studies in relation to world government" and "the dominant aim was to
organize a foundation to assist in bringing about a world government as rapidly as pos-
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Less likely to be a factor in an allegation that an institution of
higher education participated or was involved in "political activities"
is an assertion that the institution forfeited its tax status by attempting to "influence legislation" as a substantial part of its activities. Aside from such key questions as whether a college or university has engaged in such activity in its institutional capacity, and
what constitutes the influencing of legislation, revocation of an organization's tax exemption because of legislative activities must be

preceded by a finding that such activities are "substantial."' 58
A determination whether a specific activity of an exempt organization constitutes a "substantial" portion of its total activities must
always be a factual one, and the law offers no formula for computing "substantial" or "insubstantial" undertakings. 1 57 The Senate
Finance Committee said in its report accompanying the Tax Reform
Act of 1969158 that "the standards as to the permissible level of activities [that is, lobbying} under the present law are so vague as to
One approach
encourage subjective application of the sanction."'
for attempting to measure substantiality would be to determine what
percentage of an institution's spending is devoted on an annual basis' 0° to efforts to "influence legislation" (for example, as dues to
organizations that engage in a substantial amount of lobbying).
Yet the prohibition against legislative influencing is surely intended
to involve more than simply an expenditure or diversion of funds,
and should be read to include restrictions on certain activities. That
portion of an institution's efforts and activities devoted to "political" (legislative) activities is likely to be regarded as more important than institutional expenditures.'' And in the context of
sible." Id. at 1212-13.). The Senate Finance Committee attempted to write into the
Revenue Act of 1934 Ech. 277, § 101 (6), 48 Stat. 700 (now INT. REV. CODE oF 1954,
§ 501 (c) (3)] a provision prohibiting the deduction of contributions made to an organization, "a substantial part of whose activities is participation in partisan politics."
S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934). This language was deleted in conference.
156CODE § 501(c) (3); see. Treas. Regs. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(c) (3) (ii) (1959):
"An organization will not fail to meet the operational test merely because it advocates,
as an insubstantial part of its activities, the adoption or rejection of legislation."
157 In Seasongood v. Comm'r, 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955), the court advanced a 5 percent guideline. See text accompanying notes 153-54 supra.
158 Pub. L No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
159 S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1969).
160 Actually, there is little authority to support reliance on a year-to-year test to determine substantiality. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(b) (5) (iii) (b) (1966), where a
4-year period test is used to ascertain whether a charitable organization "normally" receives a "substantial part" of its support from the general public or units of government
161 This was the approach taken by the Court of Claims in denying a deduction for

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:408

activities, a percentage standard is of less utility. An institution enjoying considerable prestige and influence might be considered as
having a "substantial" impact in the legislative process solely on the
basis of a single official position statement, an activity considered
negligible when measured according to a percentage standard of
time expended.
The regulations accompanying section 501(c) (3) state that an
organization will be regarded as attempting to influence legislation
if it: "(a) Contacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a
legislative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation; or (b) Advocates the adoption or rejection of legislation." 162 This regulation should not be interpreted as requiring
as an essential element of an attempt to influence legislation that an
organization explicitly advocate contacting members of a legislative
body. Rather, it is sufficient that, as the Internal Revenue Service
Exempt Organizations Handbook states, "the proscribed activity"
involve any "appeals to the general public, not merely those that
contain a request to contact a legislator or take other specific action."
The Handbook concludes: "If the underlying purpose is the advocacy of particular legislation, then there has been an attempt to influence legislation within the meaning of the Code."' 6
The increasing tendency to involve institutions of higher education in political affairs underscores the need for more specific
criteria as to what constitutes prohibited legislative or campaignoriented activities by organizations exempt under section 501 (c) (3) -16
Congress did not shy from specificity when dealing with private
foundations in the Tax Reform Act of 1969.1"5 In levying an excise
tax on prohibited or "taxable" expenditures' 66 - an obvious device
a charitable bequest to an allegedly educational organization. League of Women Voters
v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
The regulation adds that
162 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(c) (3) (ii) (1959).
the term "legislation" includes "action by the Congress, by any State legislature, by any
local council or similar governing body, or by the public in referendum, initiative, constitutional amendment, or similar procedure." Id.
3

16 DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZA-

TIONS HANDBOOK

§ 762(2) (1970).

"[] t is reasonably clear that the opposition voiced to the use of university facilities by student groups for political campaigning, the widespread publicity concerning
the increased politicization of campus life and the apparent increased degree of direct
participation in political campaigns by active student groups, account for the present
focus on the effect of these student activities on an institution's tax exempt status."
Field, Tax Exempt Status of Universities: Impact of Political Activities By Students, 24
TAX LAW. 157, 173 (1970).
165 CODE §§ 4940-48. The term "private foundation" is defined in Id. § 509.
166 Id. § 4945.
164
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for sanctioning the nonpayment or nonincurrence of such outlays Congress was expansive in its proscription of attempts to influence
legislation. Thus, a private foundation is "forbidden" to make any
expenditure or incur any indebtedness for
any attempt to affect the opinion of the general public or any segment thereof [or] ... any attempt to influence legislation through
communication with any member or employee of a legislative body,
or with any other government official or employee who may participate in the formulation of the legislation (except technical advice or assistance provided to a governmental body or to a committee or other subdivision thereof in response to a written request
by such body or subdivision, as the case may be), other than
through making
available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study,
or research. 167

Likewise, a private foundation is "prohibited" from influencing "the
outcome of any specific public election, or [carrying] on, directly or
indirectly, any voter registration drive."' 6 The above example is
not given to advocate the extention of such proscriptions to all the
organizations described in section 501 (c) (3), but solely to illustrate
that precedent exists for more specificity in this area.
An important aspect of this matter of possible political involvement by colleges and universities where there have been manifestations of campus unrest is the question of the extent to which an
institution may engage in "political activities" (largely efforts to
influence legislation) related or incidental to its function as an educational organization.' 69 In this context, the Internal Revenue Service
1671d. § 4945 (e).
168Id. § 4945(d) (2). A private foundation is exempt from section 4945(d) (2),
however, if it meets the requirements of section 4945 (f).
1G9 In Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930), the court, in holding
gifts made to the American Birth Control League nondeductible for income tax purposes, said that attempts to influence legislation which relate to an organization's operations are not in violation of its tax exemption, but that attempts to influence other kinds
of legislation are prohibited. The court stated:
[I]here are many charitable, literary and scientific ventures that as an incident to their success require changes in the law. A charity may need a special
charter allowing it to receive larger gifts than the general laws allow. It
would be strained to say that for this reason it became less exclusively charitable, though much might have to be done to convince legislators. A society
to prevent cruelty to children, or animals, needs the positive support of law
to accomplish its ends. It must have power to coerce parents and owners,
and it does not lose its character when it seeks to strengthen its arm. A state
university is constantly trying to get appropriations from the Legislature; for
all that, it seems to us still an exclusively educational institution. Id. at 185.
In 1934, however, in the Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 23 (o) (2), 48 Stat 680,
Congress prohibited deductions for contributions made to an organization a substantial
part of whose activities is carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence
legislation. This prohibition has generally been read as prohibiting aozy attempt to
influence legislation which constitutes more than an insubstantial extent of an organi-
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recently ruled that a university will not be considered engaged in
prohibitive legislative activity if at the request of a congressional
committee a representative of the institution testifies as an expert
witness on pending legislation affecting the institution. 70 The university involved in the ruling maintains a prominent biology department and was asked by a congressional committee to furnish a representative to provide expert testimony on pending legislation bearing on biological research. The representative was specifically asked
to advise the committee on how the proposed legislation would affect
research being conducted by the university's biology department.
He appeared before the committee and testified that the proposal
would inhibit the institution's research program. The Internal Revenue Service, in finding no activity prohibited by section 501 (c) (3),
emphasized that the university "did not initiate any action with respect
to pending legislation, but merely responded to an official request
from a Congressional committee to testify."'17 Its ruling added:
"The attempts to influence legislation as described in the regulations
imply an affirmative act and require something more that a mere pas'1 72
sive response to a Committee invitation.'
The import of this ruling is that passive influence on legislation is
not a vice; but the ruling does not mean that participation in the
legislative process with respect to legislation related to the institution's educational functions falls outside the pale of the standard
of insubstantiality. 73 Congress has moved in this direction to a degree, however, in connection with the prohibitions on the activities
zation's activities, regardless of whether such attempt was to influence legislation relating to the organization's exempt status. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-449, 1970 INT.
REV. BULL. No. 9, at 35. Nevertheless, according to Slee, attempts to influence related
legislation are not violative of the requirement that the organization be organized and
operated "exclusively" for its exempt purpose: "All such activities are mediate to the
primary purpose, and would not, we should think, unclass the promoters. The agitation
is ancillary to the end in chief, which remains the exclusive purpose of the association."
Slee v. Commissioner, supra at 185. Thus, it may be contended that Congress merely
sought to reinforce the Slee holding by prohibiting substantial attempts to influence unrelated legislation, believing that attempts to influence related legislation were merely
in furtherance of the purpose for which the organization was organized and operated.
170 Rev. Rul. 70-449, 1970 INT. REV. BULL. No. 35, at 9.
171 Id. at 10.
172 Id.
173 But one of the reasons stated in the ruling to support the finding of no institutional attempt to influence legislation contains the seeds of a theory which could germinate into a liberalization of the proscription on legislative activity by section
501(c)(3) organizations: "Moreover, while the legislative history of Section 501(c)(3)
of the Code is silent on this subject, it is unlikely that Congress, in framing the language
of this provision, intended to deny itself access to the best technical expertise available
on any matter with which it concerns itself." Id. at 10.
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of private foundations. It has tempered the prohibition on attempts
to influence legislation through communication with individuals involved in the formulation of legislation with the following qualification:
[Such prohibition] shall not apply to any amount paid or incurred
in connection with an appearance before, or communication to, any
legislative body with respect to a possible decision of such body
which might affect the existence of the private foundation, its powers and duties, its tax-exampt status, or the deduction of contributions to such foundationY. 4
Should a college or university be found to have engaged in political activities (campaign-oriented or legislative) to a prohibited
extent, it would then be denominated an "action" organization. The
regulations define an "action" organization as having at least one
of three characteristics: (1) a "substantial part of its activities is at175
tempting to influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise;
(2) "it participates or intervenes, directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for
public office;' ' 17 ( and (3) its "main or primary objective or objectives (as distinguished from its incidental or secondary objectives)
may be attained only by legislation or a defeat of proposed legislation," and "it advocates, or campaigns for, the attainment of such

main or primary objective or objectives as distinguished from engaging in nonpartisan analysis, study, or research and making the
177
results thereof available to the public."'
Thus, the current state of the law in this area offers only the
most general guidelines concerning the extent to which an attempt
to "influence legislation," or the participation or intervention in any
political campaign "on behalf of" any candidate for public office,
might result in an institution of higher education being deemed in
violation of section 501(c) (3). Certainly, since these restrictions extend to colleges and universities in their corporate or institutional
capacity, a substantial expenditure of funds for lobbying efforts,' 78
or an official proclamation of support for a candidate for public
office by an institution in its own name, would violate section
§ 4945 (e).
175 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(c) (3) (ii)
174 CODE

(1959).
Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1c) (3) (iii) (1959). The use of the phrase "direcdy or indirectly" seems to indicate that the Department of the Treasury intends to
regard the fourth requirement of section 501 (c)(3) as an absolute prohibition. See
note 155 rupra.
7
17
Treas. Reg.§ 1.501 (c)(3)-1 c) (3) (iv) (1959).
78
1 See Rev. Rul. 67-293, 1967-2 CuM. BuLL. 185.
'76 Tres.
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501 (c) (3). But in recent years, campus unrest has brought about
increasing politicization of the higher education community, with the
corresponding likelihood that the "political" or "legislative" undertakings of students, faculty, or other employees of a college or university will be interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service as the
undertakings of the institution itself, thereby jeopardizing the institution's tax status.
Because of the particular focus of this article, the effect of an institution's involvement in "legislative" or "political" action on its
federal tax status will be explored only within the context of the various manifestations of campus unrest. Throughout the late spring and
summer and into the fall of 1970, students and faculty on college
and university campuses engaged in a variety of efforts directed toward congressional elections. In particular, proponents of the Indochina War were largely opposed and antiwar candidates supported.'79
In varying degrees, college and university facilities and supplies (including classrooms, other buildings, research facilities, postage
meters, telephones, mimeograph machines, and computers) were
allegedly used in these campaign undertakings. Many nationwide
coordinating groups, principally the Movement for a New Congress,
were hastily born to channel the activities and energies of this form
of campus activism.
Undoubtedly, the most well-known and accepted undertaking
by institutions of higher education that was designed to effect
the 1970 elections was a pre-November elections academic recess
of approximately 2 weeks. This undertaking, known as the "Princeton Plan" (which triggered some congressional reaction about its
propriety"8), involved simply a rearrangment of the institution's
academic calendar to enable students who wished to do so to participate in a political campaign. In most instances, the vacation
time was made up elsewhere in the school calendar, and students
and faculty were required to participate in the full academic pro179 See, e.g., Friedman, Princeton Opens War on Congressional Hawks, Detroit Free
Press, May 8, 1970, at 1.
180 For example, Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) said:
I feel that there is a serious question here as to whether or not Princeton can
legally sponsor this project [the Princeton Movement for a New Congress]
and provide facilities to aid in its success while maintaining a tax-exempt
status under Section 501 (c) (3).
I intend to ask the Treasury Department
to investigate this matter thoroughly to determine what action should be taken.
116 CONG. REc. S7099 (daily ed. May 13, 1970).
Cf. 116 CONG. REc. E6034 (daily ed. June 26, 1970) (remarks of Representative
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (D-Mass.)).
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gram. Also, in nearly every case, the institution made no recommendations concerning candidates or issues.
Thus, the matter of what constitutes institutional as opposed to
individual (and largely constitutionally protected) activity has become very relevant.
An excellent analysis prepared by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research on the subject of the implications
of political activities of colleges and universities dwelled on the
question of what political actions should be considered actions of the
institution.""1 Unlike the situation with business corporations, the
study observed, there is no clear understanding of what time belongs to the educational institution, especially where the faculty and
students are concerned (the time expectations for administrators are
of course more structured). Recognizing that it would not be feasible to fix the "time and effort that faculty and students owe to the
university," the authors of the study express the opinion that the attempt should not be made: "The freedom and absence of structure
that a university affords is not accidental; it is thought, probably
correctly, to be conducive to scholarly effort."' 1 2 The study also emphasized that "control of his time is one of the major items of compensation for the faculty member"'' and that the vital areas of academic freedom and constitutionally-protected speech should not be
infringed.
The study said that from the standpoint of the administration,
it would be decidedly unfair to deprive an institution of its tax exemption on the basis of activities neither encouraged nor condoned
by the institution and engaged in by individuals over whom it exercises little or no control. Indeed, the authors conclude, such a basis
for deprivation of a tax exemption would also be "unwise" since
then "the law would encourage political activism by students who
wished to destroy the university's tax exemption.""' And another
commentator states: "If it is clear that the restrictions in section
501 (c) (3) apply to the official acts of the university, it appears
equally certain.., that actions engaged in by members of the academic community, including students and faculty, in their individual
181 Bork, Krane, & Webster, Political Activities of Colleges and Universities, Am.
ENTERUPSE INSnTUTE (Special Analysis No. 13, 1970).
182 Id. at 13.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 14.
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capacities and not on behalf of the institution cannot be attributed
to the institution as an entity.'

1 85

Certainly the president, board of trustees, and administrative
personnel of an institution of higher education are all in a position
to officially commit the institution to a course of action aimed at influencing legislation or becoming involved in a political campaign.
Recognizing this, the commentator quoted immediately above suggests:
So long as an educational institution does not expressly empower
or otherwise authorize any student or faculty group to act for the
institution and does not commit its resources in support of a partisan activity restricted by section 501 (c) (3), the institution should
be treated as acting in a partisan sense only through its official governing body (its board of trustees), its officers or administrative
personnel acting at the direction of the governing body or other
duly authorized bodies in accordance with the terms of the institution's governing charter'18 6
Nevertheless, the problem of whether students, 8 7 and particularly
faculty,a 88 can cause an otherwise unwilling institution to commit a
proscribed act is a difficult one. One example is the issue of whether
a student-operated newspaper may endanger the tax status of the
sponsoring college or university by publicly endorsing a particular
candidate for public office.189 In this era of increasing policitization
185 Field, supra note 164, at 164.
186 Id. at 165.
187 One of the approaches suggested to the President in the Brock report on student
unrest (see note 74 supra) as a partial answer to campus unrest is to "encourage student
participation in politics." The report states:
We found that the overwhelming majority of students with whom we visited
hold little regard for either political party. The questioning of our system
of government points to a loss of confidence in established institutions and
that includes political parties. An increase in this loss of confidence poses a
serious danger to the viable functioning of American government. Just as
government must be responsive, so must political parties be responsive and
open. 115 CONG. REC. 17,413 (1969).
188The authors of the American Enterprise Institute study apparently endorse the
rule "that formal faculty political action [is] university action," on the ground that such
a rule "would... contribute to one of the major policy objectives of Section 501 (c) (3)
by tending to keep universities out of partisan politics." Bork, Krane, & Webster,
supra note 181, at 15. They admit, however, that such a policy presents difficulties.
189 Representative Abner Mikva (D-Ill.), on February 2, 1971, introduced a bill
that would eliminate any threat of an institution being denied tax exempt status because
of editorial policies of its sponsored student newspaper. The bill, which would amend
sections 501(c) (3) and 170(c) (2) (D) of the Code, states: "Provided, That for the
purposes of this section, the editorial policy or activities of a student-operated school
or college or university newspaper shall not be attributed to the educational institution
to which the newspaper is related." H.R. 3300, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted
in 117 CONG. REC. E378 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1970). See also Abbott, The Student
Press: Some Second Thoughts, 16 WAYNE L REv. 989 (1970); Abbott, The Student
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of the higher education community, the threat of such student activities endangering an institution's tax status becomes an issue of
special significance.
The American Council on Education has issued guidelines in this
area,1 90 although their scope and purpose is limited. They constitute a warning to colleges and universities about the criteria of
section 501(c) (3). Although most public institutions derive their
exempt status from Code section 115 (a) and thus technically are not
subject to the restriction of section 501(c) (3),1 1 the Council,
acting upon the assumption that the restrictions should apply to
public and private institutions alike insofar as political activities are
concerned (particularly as the restrictions relate to intervention in
political campaigns), issued the guidelines for all colleges and universities. In addition, because issuance of the guidelines would have
been of little use unless approved in some manner by the Internal
Revenue Service, the affirmative statements contained in the guidelines were limited to those in which the highest officials of the Internal Revenue Service could acquiesce. In situations where agreement was not possible, the guidelines call to the attention of the
colleges and universities the possibility of problems.
Although the guidelines call attention to the general restriction
on legislative activities, they were of necessity concerned principally
with the proscription against an institution's intervention in any
"campaign on behalf of a candidate for public office." This was
primarily attributable to the public furor and congressional concern
generated by campus activities in the fall campaigns of 1970.
The thrust of the American Council on Education guidelines is
basically twofold: they sanction the so-called "Princeton Plan,"
which, as previously discussed, relates to the rearrangement of the
academic calender, and they recommend that colleges and universities be reimbursed by student and faculty groups that use facilities or
services of the institutions in connection with off-campus election
activities. The guidelines caution that extraordinary or prolonged
use of university facilities, particularly by nonmembers of the university community, might raise questions; and they further advise
against allowing off-campus groups to solicit funds in the name of
Press: Some First Impressions, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1969); Hudgins, Academic Freedom and the Student Press, 6 WAKE FOREST INTR. L. REV. 40 (1969).
100 AMERICAN COUNCn. ON EDUCAnON GuiDELINEs (June 21, 1970), excerpted
in, 4 CCH 1971 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 5 3033.197.
101 See Bork, Krane & Webster, supra note 181, at 48;
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the institution which are to be used on behalf of candidates for public office.
Although the guidelines note that every member of the higher
education community has a right to participate or not participate in
the election process, they warn that those in a position to officially
speak for a college or university should make it clear when expressing personal views that they are not speaking for their institution.
The basic problem faced in drafting the guidelines was the lack
of any regulations, rulings, or legislative history which might suggest what Congress had in mind when enacting the restrictions relating to influencing legislation and participating in campaigns. It
is clear that Congress had no specific "intent" as such with respect
to either provision. Each resulted from the personal pique of an
individual Senator to deal with a single private foundation whose
activities were probably invalid under the law then in effect, and
each was enacted without benefit of hearing or explanation. 11 2 There
is not the slightest evidence that Congress realized it was dealing
with the activities of public charities such as colleges or universities.
And it is obvious that no thought was given to the possible constitutional implications of the strictures.
Neither the courts nor the Commissioner should attempt to build
from such a weak foundation an interpretation "so burdensome (and
discriminatory) as to place an unfair burden on the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms."' 93 Although it may be questioned whether
colleges and universities have first amendment rights,'194 the government may not, in the guise of dealing with the tax exemption of
the institution, curtail or limit the first amendment rights of the
members of the educational community to speak, to publish, or to
petition the Government. It is a mistake to argue that because a tax
exemption is a "privilege," its denial may not infringe free speech. 9 5
The denial of a tax exemption to an educational institution is not the
same, for example, as the denial of a deduction for legislative expenses, where the question is simply whether the taxpayer will pay
for such activities out of his own pocket before or after taxes. The
mere suggestion by the Internal Revenue Service that the tax-exempt
status of a particular institution is subject to challenge could be distext accompanying notes 146-50 supra.
193 Note, Regulating The PoliticalActivity Of Foundations, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1843,
1863-64 (1970).
194 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
195 Note, Unconstitutional Conditions,73 HARV. L. REV. 1595, 1599-1600 (1960).
192 See
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astrous, not only for that institution, but for all colleges and universities. Few institutions could exist without the unchallenged exempt
status, dependent as they are on contributions and bequests. Thus,
the possibility of infringement of constitutional freedoms is very real
indeed. The very questioning of an exemption could cause an institution to restrict the activities of the members of the educational
community. Moreover, although the proscription against participation or intervention in any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office is reasonably precise, the proviso that no substantial part of an exempt institution's activities may center on
attempts to influence legislation is unconscionably vague. This raises
an additional constitutional issue, namely, the first amendment "doctrine of overbreadth."'' "
No court should permit a vaguely worded provision to impose a
penalty upon colleges and universities because of the exercise of
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. This is particularly true
where the penalty may endanger the very existence of the institution itself. Thus, in view of the vagueness of one of the provisions,
the complete absence of any discernible legislative intent, and, especially, the failure of Congress to consider their constitutional implications, the politically restrictive provisions of section 501(c) (3)
must be interpreted in a manner calculated to avoid first amendment
97
problems.
Read in light of the above, the American Council on Education guidelines must not be interpreted as suggesting restrictions on
the activities of colleges and universities and the members of their
communities. Rather, they must be viewed as a statement of dearly
permissible activities with a warning about areas where a college or
university in its institutional capacity should proceed with care and
caution.
A dear distinction must be made between those activities which
do not pertain to legislation (prospective or present), those activities
which carry legislative implications, and those activities which involve intervention in "a political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office." The first should not be affected by the restrictions of Section 501(c) (3). The second and third cannot be
curtailed unless the institutional involvement is dearly established.
Especially where the seemingly absolute prohibition against partici196 See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L REV. 844,
871-75 (1970).
97
1 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

22: 408

pation or intervention in a campaign for a candidate for office is concerned, the activities of members of the educational community cannot be attributed to the institution unless the institution's corporate
involvement is established. Thus, as the guidelines indicate, the
mere rearrangement of an academic schedule to make a vacation
available immediately before an election is not institutional participation. Nor can the institution be charged with the activities of a
political club located on the campus and provided with space and
facilities, and whose members may engage in partisan politics and
political campaigns. Nor can the institution be held accountable
for the individual activities of its trustees, administrators, students,
and faculty.
The collective activities of individuals making up the educational
community cannot be attributed to the institution unless the institution permits them to speak for it. For this reason, the guidelines
recommend that every institution should make it clear whether
bodies purporting to speak in its name have authority to do so.
Ordinarily, an institution should not be held accountable for making
its facilities available on a nonpartisan basis with or without charge.
And certainly, where campaigns are involved, a regular and usual
charge should be made for facilities and services, particularly where
those participating are not members of the academic community.
The guidelines suggest, however, that the Internal Revenue Service
is concerned that a seemingly neutral and impartial act may in fact
constitute an endorsement of a candidate or candidates. Thus, an
excessive and abnormal use of campus facilities (that would otherwise be devoted to educational activities) for political campaigns
of candidates representing a single point of view could raise questions under the Code, even if a reasonable fee is charged. It is difficult, however, to conceive of a situation where such a massive use
of facilities could give rise to a successful challenge of institutional
involvement.
The great uncertainties attending interpretations of the Code in
this area exemplify the pressing need for clarification of the applicable law. In this age of increasing individual activism, fairness dictates that the colleges and universities involuntarily caught up in
activists' endeavors have a better appraisal of the laws that affect
their functions and existence to such a considerable degree. The
American Council on Education guidelines reflect the concern of
institutions of higher education with these problems, and represent
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an attempt to resolve some of the questions until the law itself is updated.
V.

COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES AND THE

FEDERAL CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

The federal tax status of colleges and universities is always a
matter of concern to them because exemption from taxation and
support through private contributions is essential to their continued
existence. Thus, the suggestion by the Department of the Treasury
and the Internal Revenue Service that campus political activities
might jeopardize a college or university's tax status could not be
deemed totally unexpected within the higher education community.
But the thought that student and faculty political activism might
bring institutions within the proscriptions of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act 9 8 was a wholly alien concept.
The ostensibly applicable provision of the Act is section 610 of
Title 18 of the United States Code, which reads in part as follows:
It is unlawful for... any corporation whatever.., to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which
Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress
are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or
political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of
the foregoing offices ....

199

Any corporation that violates section 610 is subject to a fine not in
excess of $5,000; every officer or director of a corporation who consents to such a violation may be fined up to $1,000 or imprisoned
up to 1 year, or both; and if an officer or director willfully violates
section 610, he may be fined up to $10,000 or imprisoned for 2 years,
or both. 0 0
The development of section 610 dearly reveals that its application to institutions of higher education was never a consideration in
its enactment, and it has never been so applied. As an outgrowth
of President Theodore Roosevelt's annual message to the Congress
in 1906, a law prohibiting political contributions by corporations was
first enacted in 1907. This statute 201 made unlawful "money contributions" by corporations in connection with any election involving the selection of Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors or
19818 U.S.C. § 610 (1964).
log Id.
200 Id.
201 Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 240, 34 Stat. 864.
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House members, or any election by state legislatures of United States
Senators. Eighteen years later, prompted by the Supreme Court's
decision in Newberry v. United States" 2 - which invalidated a federal ceiling on primary election expenditures by congressional candidates2" 3 - Congress, after reviewing existing legislation, enacted
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.204 Present-day section
610 had its genesis in section 313 of that Act. The 1925 Act
amended the term "money contributions," as used in the 1907 Act,
to read simply "contribution." A contribution was defined as including a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value, and a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or
not legally enforceable, to make a contribution. 0 5
Financial outlays by labor organizations in connection with federal elections throughout the 1940s generated further congressional
action.2" 6 The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947207
amended section 313 to include contributions by labor unions, and
also to proscribe "expenditures" (as well as contributions) in connection with federal elections. During Senate debate on the bill,
Senator Robert Taft stated that the latter expansion of section 313
was made "to plug up a loophole which obviously developed, and
which, if the courts had permitted advantage to be taken of it, as a
matter of fact, would absolutely have destroyed the prohibition
against political advertising by corporations."' ,, The "loophole" to
which Senator Taft made reference was the possibility that an indirect contribution might not be deemed a violation of Section 313.209
When Congress enacted Title 18 of the United States Code into
202256 U.S. 232 (1921).
203 Although the Newberry case did not directly concern itself with the Act of 1907,
it was widely construed to have invalidated all federal corrupt practices legislation relating to nominations and primary elections. See, e.g., United States v. CIO, 335 U.S.
106, 114 (1948). Thus, Congress felt compelled to modify the 1907 Act, which had
been applicable to nominating procedures, to expressly exclude primaries and conventions. See Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tir. III, § 302, 43 Star. 1070
(now contained in 2 U.S.C. § 241 (Supp. V, 1970).
204 Ch. 368, tit.
III, §§ 301-18, 43 Star. 1070 (codified in scattered sections of 2,
18 U.S.C.).
205 Id. § 302(d), at 1071.
206 The War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Star. 163, had made section 313 temporarily applicable to labor organizations during the continuation of the
World War II hostilities and for 6 months after their cessation.
207 Ch. 120, tit.
III, 61 Star. 136.
208 93 CONG.REc. 6439 (1947).
209 Senator Taft stated: "If 'contribution' does not mean 'expenditure,' then a candidate for office could have his corporation friends publish an advertisement for him
in the newspapers every day for a month before election." Id.
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positive law in 1948,210 section 313 was repealed and replaced with
section 610. The judicial history of section 610 is as vacant as its
legislative history with respect to its potential applicability to colleges
and universities. Although a detailed overview of this judicial history"" is outside the scope of this article, a gleaning of the cases
indicates that section 610 embodies a twofold design: (1) to prevent
powerful and wealthy corporations and labor unions from controlling elections, and (2) to prevent union officials from endorsing
candidates or attempting to influence votes contrary to the wishes
212
of individual union members.
Most of the section 610 cases revolve around the question of
what constitutes a prohibited "contribution or expenditure." Section
591 of Title 1821' defines the term "contribution" to include: "a gift,
subscription, loan, advance, or deposit, of money, or anything of
value, and . . .a contract, promise, or agreement to make a con-

tribution, whether or not legally enforceable." The same section
defines "expenditure" to include: "a payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift, of money, or anything of value, and . . .
a contract, promise, or agreement to make an expenditure, whether
214
or not legally enforceable."
In 1948, the Supreme Court, in United States v. CIO,21 5 said that
the term "expenditure" as employed in section 313 "is not a word
of art. It has no definitely defined meaning and the applicability
of the word to prohibition of particular acts must be determined
from the circumstances surrounding its employment."2 16 Stating
that "the purpose of Congress is a dominant factor in determining
meaning," 21 7 the Court discussed the definition of "expenditure" as

follows:
When Congress coupled the word "expenditure" with the word
"contribution," it did so because the practical operation of § 313
in previous elections showed the need to strengthen the bars against
the misuse of aggregated funds gathered into the control of a sin2 10

Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683.
See Barton, Corporationsin Politics: How Far Can They Go Under the Law?,
50 A.B.AJ. 228 (1964); Comment, Constitutionality of Section 610 of the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act, 46 CALIF. L.REV. 439 (1958).
212 See United States v. Anchorage Cent. Labor Council, 193 F. Supp. 504, 508 (D.
Alas. 1961).
213 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1964).
214 Id.
211

215 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
2161d.
217 Id.

at 112.
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gle organization from many individual sources. Apparently "expenditure" was added to eradicate the doubt that had been raised
as to the reach of 'econtribution," not to extend greatly the cover2 18
age of the section.

Three years later, a federal district court, in United States v.
Construction Local 264,19 although conceding that "it is impossible
to reconcile just exactly what the Congress intended by its definition
of 'expenditure,' "220 considered and rejected a construction of the
term that would hold a corporation or labor organization in violation of section 610 whenever an officer or employee was permitted
to "spend a few hours hauling voters to a place of registering, to
vote, or to engage in any other type of political activity."2'21
In 1957, in United States v. UAW, 222 the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of an indictment of a labor union charged with
violating section 610 by using union dues to sponsor television
broadcasts designed to influence the election of certain congressional
candidates. The Court stated that "the evil at which Congress has
struck in Section 313 is the use of corporation or union funds to
influence the public at large to vote for a particular candidate or a
' 223
particular party.
As the preceding cases indicate, although the purposes of section
610 may be relatively clear, the question of what constitutes a prohibited "expenditure or contribution" has not been resolved and
must be determined on a case by case basis. This absence of controlling precedents introduces considerable flexibility in the application of section 610. As a result, the issue is left open whether a
college or university has made proscribed "indirect contributions"
in connection with a federal election where "political activities" appear to be supported by the institution, either through statements
of the administration or faculty, or through the provision of facilities or services in support of student or faculty groups actively engaged in political campaigns.
An obvious preliminary question, of course, is whether section
610 is even applicable to an institution of higher education. For
2 18

Id. at 122 (emphasis added). For further judicial interpretation of the interplay between the terms "expenditure" and "contribution," see United States v. Painters
Local 481, 172 F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1949).
219 101 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
220 Id. at 876.
221 Id.

U.S. 567 (1957).
Id. at 589. See also United States v. Lewis Food Co., 366 F.2d 710 (9th Cir.

222 352
223

1966).
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section 610 to apply to an institution, the institution would have
to be regarded as a "corporation." As noted earlier, there is little
in the legislative history of section 610 and its predecessors, or in
the relevant case law, to either support or rebut the assertion that an
institution of higher education is a "corporation" for purposes of
section 610.4
In Sherman County v. Simons,22 5 decided in 1884, the Supreme
Court indicated that, unless a contrary intent is expressly stated, the
term "corporation" in the Nebraska constitution referred only to
"private corporations," rather than to "municipal corporations" or
"public corporations. '2 26 According to the weight of authority, state
colleges and universities at least, assuming arguendo that they are corporate entities, -7 may be "public" rather than "private" corporations.
For example, in People ex rel. Board of Trustees of University of
Illinois v. Barrett,2 - 8 decided in 1943, the Supreme Court of Illinois
stated that although the University of Illinois was by statute a corporation, it was not a "private corporation," but rather was a "public
corporation, organized for the sole purpose of conducting and operating the university as a state institution."2 29 The court said that
the university was a "public" corporation because private individuals
had no interest or control over it and because it was entirely under
the power of the state legislature.2 3 And in Kerr v. City of Louisville,231' decided in 1937, a Kentucky court of appeals held that a
provision of the Kentucky state constitution prohibiting "corporations" from engaging in business unless authorized by charter or
law to do so applied only to "private" corporations and not to the
224There is some indication in the legislative history, however, that section 610
was not meant to be limited to profit-making corporations. During the Senate debate
on section 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, tit. III, § 304,
61 Star. 159, Senator Robert Taft profferred his opinion that an incorporated religious
organization "cannot take the church members' money and use it for the purpose of
trying to elect a candidate or defeat a candidate, and they should not do so." 93 CONG.
REc 6550 (1947).
225109 U.S. 735 (1884).
226 Id. at 740.
227 There is some question among the courts whether a state university can simultaneously exist as a separate corporate entity (that is, a "public corporation") and as an
agent or instrumentality of the state. See, e.g., Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin v. Illinois, 404 Ill. 193, 88 N.E.2d 489 (1949), appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 906

(1950).

IM.321, 46 N.E.2d 951 (1943).
at 338, 46 N.E.2d at 960.
230 Id. at 339, 46 N.E.2d at 961.
21271
Ky. 335, 111 S.W.2d 1046 (Ky. Ct. App. 1937).
228382
229 Id.
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University of Louisville. 232 Thus, the argument might be made that
section 610 applies only to "private" corporations and thus is inapplicable to state colleges and universities.
That argument, however, would not benefit private colleges and
universities. And it is doubtful that it would be of any benefit to
most state institutions. By its own terms, section 610 is applicable to
-any corporation whatever." The American Enterprise Institute
study concluded: "The broad language of [section 6101 and its legislative history leave little doubt that it covers incorporated colleges and universities with the exception of some institutions that
may operate as integral parts of state governments. 2 1 33
Assuming, then, that most colleges and universities, whether public or private, are "corporations" for purposes of section 610, what
would constitute a prohibited "contribution or expenditure [by such
an institution] in connection with" a federal election? Obviously,
a direct contribution by an educational institution, in its own name,
to a candidate for a federal elective office, or to one of the candidate's campaign committees, would violate section 610. And the
' 4 and
legislative history23
case law surrounding section 610 indicates
that the term "expenditure" should be read as "indirect contribution" in connection with federal elections. For example, in United
States v. UA W, 2"5 the Supreme Court held that the use of union dues
to sponsor commercial television broadcasts designed to influence
the electorate to select certain candidates for Congress constituted
"precisely the kind of indirect contribution" contemplated by the
term "expenditure. 2 3 Besides encompassing "indirect contributions," section 610 "expenditures" include more than just cash outlays; an "expenditure" may be "anything of value." 7 Thus, the
deployment of an educational institution's facilities, or members of
its administration, faculty, students, or employees, on behalf of a
political candidate for federal office, when done as an official act of
2 32

For other state institutions of higher education deemed "public corporations,"
see Page v. Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 93 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1937), rev'd on
other grounds sub nomn. Allen v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439
(1938); Moscow Hardware Co. v. Colson, 158 F. 199 (C.C.N.D. Idaho 1907); In re
Royer's Estate, 123 Cal. 614, 56 P. 461 (1899); Todd v. Curators of the Univ. of
Missouri, 347 Mo. 460, 147 S.W.2d 1063 (1941); State ex rel. Wyoming Agricultural
College v. Irvine, 14 Wyo. 318, 84 P. 90 (1906), aff'd, 206 U.S. 278 (1907).
233 Bork, Krane & Webster, supra note 181, at 26.
234 See notes 208-09 supra & accompanying text.
235352 U.S. 567 (1957).
236 Id. at 585.
237 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1964); see text accompanying note 214 supra.

1971]

CAMPUS UNREST

the university, could be deemed a violation of section 610. Conversely, as long as an institution of higher education officially maintains neutrality on political issues, no violation of section 610 should
result when members of the educational community, as individuals,
engage in political activities without institutional sponsorship or fi38
nancial support1
There is also a question of how large a contribution or expenditure must be made before section 610 is violated. On its face, section 610 is absolute; it prohibits any contribution or expenditure.
There is some indication, however, that some kind of a substantiality test might be read into section 610. ,In United States v. Construction Local 264,30 a federal district court said in dictum: "[Ilt
is hard to conceive that the Congress had in mind when it enacted
[section 610] that an uncertain, insignificant amount such as is involved here [$350.451 should be considered as an expenditure and
used as a basis for a criminal prosecution."2 40
At least one conclusion can be attempted in regard to the likelihood of an institution of higher education being found in violation
of section 610 as a result of its own political activities or those of its

members. Under Code section 501(c) (3) an educational institution will lose its tax-exempt status if it participates in or intervenes
"in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office."
This provision is broader than section 610, which proscribes a "contribution or expenditure" by "any corporation whatever . . . in connection with" federal elections. Therefore, an institution of higher
education which satisfies Code section 501(c) (3) will presumably
be operating outside the interdictions of section 610. But, of course,
there is no guarantee that the United States Attorney, or the courts,
will be at all influenced by the position of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
23

SThis analysis raises anew questions confronted earlier (see notes 181-97 supra
& accompanying text) as to which individuals speak and act officially for an institution,
and when acts (often constitutionally protected) of administrators, faculty, students,
and employees can be differentiated from offidal acts of the institution. See Haley,
Students, Politics, and Education: Notes on the Crisis, 46 COLLEGE & U. 61 (1970).
239 101 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
240 Id. at 873. The court reached this conclusion, even after admitting that the
maxim of de ininimus non curat lex does not apply in criminal cases. Id. See also
United States v. Painters Local 481, 172 F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1949), where expenditures totaling $143.64 were characterized as "trifling."
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PROPOSED CAMPUS UNREST LEGISLATION
IN THE 91ST CONGRESS

As mentioned earlier,24 ' one of Congress' prime responses to campus unrest has been to toughen existing, and write more expansive,
federal criminal laws. Although thus far the sole product of this
approach has been Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970,22 congressmen have authorized tens of proposals to further use

the federal criminal laws in this area. Additionally, many civil penalties for campus disruptions have been advanced. None of these proposals came to fruition during the 91st Congress - largely because
of the opposition of the committee leaders involved - but further
activity in this regard may be anticipated in the 92nd Congress in
direct proportion to the degree of campus unrest in 1971 and 1972.
Also, amendments designed to curb campus unrest will almost assuredly be offered to the legislation authorizing existing federal
support of higher education, which must be considered in 1971.
Among the most popular of the proposals considered by the
91st Congress were amendments to the federal criminal code designed to prohibit the disruption of the administration or operations
of federally-assisted institutions of higher education.2 13 The proposed amendments would have imposed criminal penalties for acts
of appropriation, occupation, damage, or destruction of property of
federally-assisted educational institutions, or acts of denial or
abridgement of the right of any person to participate in or enjoy
the benefits of activities conducted or provided by such institution,
where such acts were committed with intent to prevent, obstruct,
or interfere with the orderly administration or operation of such institution.24 4
Another heavily-sponsored proposal 4 would have made it a
crime to deny any person the benefits of any educational program
See text accompanying notes 41-49 supra.
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922.
243 This approach was initiated in the 91st Congress by Senator Robert C. Byrd
(D-W.Va.) and Representative William J. B. Dorn (D-S.C.), in legislation introduced on April 22, 1969, and April 24, 1969, respectively. S. 1929, H.R. 10544,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
244
See H.R. 10617, H.R. 10796, H.R. 10856, H.R. 10892, H.R. 10940, H.R.
11731, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 19456, H.R. 19457, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970).
245 On June 2, 1969, 20 House members, led by former Representative William C.
Cramer (R-Fla.), introduced the proposed Student Antiviolence Act of 1969. H.R.
11802, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See also H.R. 12060, H.R. 12238, H.R. 13261,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 18080, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (the proposed
First Amendment Freedoms Act).
241

242
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or activity where federal financial support is involved. Other variations on this theme were: a bill to assure the safety of all students
enrolled in institutions of higher learning; 246 the proposed Student
Disturbances Act of 1969, -47 designed to assist those who desire to
pursue their education in a disruption-free campus atmosphere and
to assure reasonable protection of the federal investment in higher
educational programs; and a new criminal statute to curb campus
violence by making unlawful the carrying of a weapon in violation
of any law, regulation, ordinance or rule, on the property of any
institution of higher education that receives or disburses federal
248
funds.
Despite the emphasis by many members of Congress on the use
of federal criminal statutes to counter campus unrest, the most widespread demand throughout the 91st Congress was that colleges and
universities, under penalty of having their federal support suspended, formulate reasonable programs to curb student and faculty
disorders. This approach was often coupled with a requirement that
federal assistance to professors and instructors who foment disorders
through violations of law be terminated.2 49
The legislation devoted solely to the subject of campus unrest
that came closest to enactment in the 91st Congress, was the proposed Higher Education Protection and Freedom of Expression Act
Introduced on June 9, 1969, and referred to the House
of 1969.2
(the proposed Safe Campus Act, in240 H.R. 11830, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)
troduced on June 3, 1969, by Representative James G. O'Hara (D-Mich.)).
247 S. 2677, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (introduced on July 22, 1969, by Senator
John L. McClellan and four cosponsors). See also H.R. 11731, S. 1988, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969) (the proposed Academic Freedom Protective Act of 1969).
248
H.R. 10672, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (introduced on April 29, 1969, by
Representative Ed Foreman (R-N.M.)).
249 See H.R. 10074, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), introduced on April 5, 1969,
by Representative William M. Harsha (R-Ohio). Commenting later on his bill, Representative Harsha said that "he felt it would be more effective to go to the pocketbooks of the administrators .... We are trying to give [college and university officials)
some guts." Wash Post, May 8, 1969, § A, at 12. Thus, H.R. 10074 would have required the suspension of federal financial assistance to colleges and universities that are
experiencing campus unrest and fail to take appropriate corrective measures within a
reasonable time. The measure would also have required the termination of federal financial assistance to teachers, instructors, and lecturers guilty of violation of any law in
connection with such unrest. This concept was subsequently subscribed to by several
representatives of both parties of the House. See H.R. 10136, H.R. 10806, H.R. 10821,
H.R. 10848, H.R. 10895, H.R. 10911, H.R. 10929, H.R. 10970, H.R. 11010, H.R.
11018, H.R. 11029, H.R. 11043, H.R. 11065, H.R. 11837, H.R. 11972, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969). See also S. 4514, H.R. 19455, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
2 0
5 H.R. 11941, H.R. 12102, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (introduced on June 9,
1969, by Representative Edith Green (D-Ore.)). See also H.R. 17718, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970). See generally H.R. 11491, H.R. 11589, H.R. 11653, 91st Cong.,
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Special Subcommittee on Education, the thrust of the bill was a requirement that colleges and universities receiving federal financial
assistance file with the United States Commissioner of Education
"certificates of affirmation" certifying that they had adopted codes
of campus conduct. These codes of conduct were to be developed
through consultation among students, faculty, and administrators.
"As a minimum," a code would have had to (1) assure adequate
opportunity for free expression, consultation, and orderly discussion
of educational and associated problems concerning trustees, administrators, faculty, and students; (2) govern administrative practice,
and the conduct of students, faculty and other staff, and visitors on
an institution's property and facilities; (3) assure that fair procedures would be adopted to deal with cases of administrative personnel, faculty and other staff, and students, charged with violation of
an institution's rules and regulations, and (4) clearly set forth a
table of penalties for violations of such rules and regulations. Under the proposed act, where an institution failed to file a certificate,
the Commissioner of Education would have been obligated to "immediately give notice [of ineligibilityj to all federal departments
and agencies providing financial assistance for programs and activities at the institution." The bill also would have extended and expanded the provisions of the Higher Education Amendments of
1968, relating to the denial of federal assistance to students involved
in serious campus disturbances. 5'
During the month of June, 1969, the subcommittee struggled
with the legislation, often thwarted by procedural maneuvers effected by the bill's opponents. Representative John L. Erlenborn
(R-Ill.), a cosponsor of the legislation, expressed the main problem
the subcommittee faced in drafting a campus unrest bill: "On the
one hand, we must stop violence and disruption in expressing dissent, and, on the other, we must make sure that peaceful means of
free expression and demonstration are available. '2 52 When the bill
was taken up by the parent committee, the provision that would
have denied assistance to institutions failing to file a certificate was
1st Sess. (1969), all of which were introduced by various Representatives to supplement Representative Green's initially proposed Act. The proposed Higher Education
Protection and Freedom of Expression Act of 1969 was introduced in the Senate by
Senator Robert C. Byrd (D.-W.Va.). S. 2055, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
The
Act continued to receive support in the second session of the 91st Congress. See H.R.
19129, H.R. 19397, H.R. 19688, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See also H.R. 19455,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
251 See notes 81-86 supra & accompanying text.
252 Wash. Evening Star, June 4, 1969, § A, at 7.
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struck down by a vote of 19 to 16. The parent committee then
voted 18 to 17 to send the remainder of the bill back to the subcommittee, from which it never reemerged. Representative Edith Green
(D-Ore.), chairman of the subcommittee, said that the bill was
"quite moderate" compared with other measures being introduced in
the House, 253 and correctly predicted that the effect of these votes
would be to transfer the issue to the House floor where it would be
translated into efforts to insert portions of the bill as riders in other
legislation. 25
A number of other proposals designed to cope with campus unrest were advanced in the 91st Congress. Injunctive relief to prevent serious disruption of federally-assisted colleges and universities
was advocated. 255 A bill was offered to create a Federal Higher
Education Mediation and Conciliation Service that would proffer its
services in any dispute which may lead or had led to campus violence. 256 And a study of student unrest on American campuses was
offered.25 7
Congressional response to incidents of campus unrest and disorder has generally been that of vindictiveness and anger. This
fact is reflected not only in the provisions inserted in various appropriations and authorization bills, 2 8 but also in the numerous forms
of proposed legislation dealing directly with campus unrest. Much
of the campus unrest legislation introduced in the 91st Congress
(and early in the 92nd2 59) has been largely punitive and frequently
harshly repressive. 260 Perhaps the chief characteristic of these mea253

N. Y. Times, July 2, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 8 An editorial in The Washington
Post agreed: "Mrs. Green's proposals were 'moderate' - or at any rate more moderate
than a number of recklessly punitive measures that have been suggested by some
congressional disciplinarians untrammeled by any experience with or responsibility for
education." Wash. Post., July 3, 1969, § A, at 14.
254 Wash. Post, July 2, 1969, § A, at 1.
See also H.R.
255 S. 2520, S. 2827, and H.R. 13842, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
13261, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
2 6
5 H.R. 10570, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
See also S. Res. 192, 91st Cong.,
257 S.J. Res. 109, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
1st Sess. (1969), a resolution, submitted by the late Senator Everett M. Dirksen (RIll.), calling on the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate the impairment of the
internal security of the United States arising from disorders at educational institutions.
258 These bills are discussed in full in section III supra.
259
See S. 14, H.RL 359, H.L 825, H.R. 920, H.R. 1501, H.R. 1668, H.1L 1669,
H.IL 2643, H.R. 3949, 31R. 5600, H.R. 6125, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
260 Joseph Kraft has written unsparingly of "the political philistines now itching
for all the usual rabble-rousing reasons to lay their murderous hands on the student
dissenters." Kraft, Vast ProgressIs Being Made In Cooling Off the Campuses, Wash.
Post, June 10, 1969, § A, at 19.
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sures is their unimaginativeness in coping with campus unrest nearly all are set in a punishment mold - and their authors' inability or unwillingness to appreciate the extent to which campus unrest
is outside the proper and, in most instances, effective reach of federal
legislation. The various legislative proposals bear out the admonition of the Commission on Campus Unrest that legislative "solutions" to the "problem" of campus unrest are nonexistent.2 6' Nonetheless, as has been stressed throughout, the American citizenry in
general has been demanding an end to campus disturbances and violence. Thus Congress may be simply carrying out its function of
mirroring public opinion and bringing it to bear on policy formulation. As Senator Mark 0. Hatfield (R-Ore.) remarked:
I think it is interesting that most of the really strong and rather
vindictive measures [on the subject of campus unrest] were found
primarily in the House rather than the Senate. This more than
likely reflects the fact that the House considers
itself closer to gen262
eral public sentiment than the Senate.
VII.

CAMPUS UNREST AND THE
STATE LEGISLATURES

The state legislatures have responded to the increased incidence
of campus unrest2 63 with unmitigated zeal. This section contains a
2
brief survey of their various responses.

64

The Commission on Campus Unrest estimated that by the time
its report was completed in mid-1970, more than 30 states had enacted a total of nearly 80 laws on the subject of campus unrest.

65

More states have acted since that time. Glenn S. Dumke, Chancellor
of the California State Colleges, wrote in 1969 that the "stirring
among students and young people generally for change" is generating
"repressive legislation" in many states.266 These observations are
REPORT, supra note 9, at 213.
262 Hatfield, Public Pressures on Higher Education, in THE TROUBLED CAMPUS
75, 78 (G. Smith ed. 1970).
263 See text accompanying notes 1-8 supra.
264 For a comprehensive review of state legislative activity in this area during most
of 1969 and 1970, see I EDUCATION COMM. OF THE STATES, HIGHER EDUCATION IN
THE STATES, No. 7, Sept. 1970.
26 5
CAMPuS UNREST REPORT, supra note 9, at 40.
2 66
Dumke, Bad Day at Generation Gap, in THE UNIVERSITY AND REVOLUTION
121, 125 (G. Weaver & J. Weaver eds. 1969). Chancellor Dumke added that "[m)ore
than seventy-five separate bills dealing with control of campus disturbances are currently pending in the two houses of the California Legislature." Id. Gary R. Weaver,
an instructor in the School of International Service at The American University, Washington, D.C., and coeditor of The University and Revolution, writes that the "numer261 CAMPUS UNREST
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confirmed by surveys conducted under the direction of the Office of
Research and Information of the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges. The association's analyses show
that in calendar year 1969, 64 statutes directly relating to campus
unrest and disturbances were enacted in 32 states,267 while in calendar 1970, 17 new laws on the subject were approved in 12 states. 6 8
In terms of actual enactments, the most recurrent mode of legislative response to campus unrest in the state legislatures has been
criminal code provisions which impose fines or imprisonment, or
both, upon individuals convicted of preventing the free and normal
use of college and university property and facilities by members of
the higher education community. For example, the Michigan Legislature enacted a provision (effective August 1, 1970) proscribing
as a misdemeanor the "unreasonable prevention or disruption of the
customary and lawful functions" of a "publicly owned and operated
institution of higher education" by "occupying space necessary therefor or by use of force or by threat of force" by any person who violates the "properly promulgated rules of the institution" and willfully refuses to "vacate the premises, building or other structure of
the institution" after having been directed to do so by the institution's chief administrative officer or his designee.2 69 Similarly, the
Washington State Legislature, at the request of the University of
Washington, passed an act (effective May 14, 1970) making it
unlawful, as a gross misdemeanor, for "any person, singly or in concert with others, to interfere by force or violence with any adminous bills ... being written to control the campus 'revolts" are reflections of "a very
strong reactionary response in what might be termed the traditional middle class."
Introduction to id. at 7 (reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey). Joseph Alsop offered this opinion: "In all state legislatures, and
in Congress, too, the troubles in the universities have . . . caused a perfect spate of
generally ugly bills." Alsop, Congress Has Whip It Can Use Against Student McCarthyism, Wash. Post, Apr. 30, 1969, § A, at 27.
267
J. Gonzalez, Jr., State Laws of 1969 Dealing with Student Unrest, Nov. 5, 1969
(memorandum of law prepared for the National Association of State Universities
and Land-Grant Colleges). Mr. Gonzalez, who is a Special Assistant for Legislative
Relations at Rutgers, the State University, has observed that "1969 has been a year of
unusual legislative activity throughout the country in the area of student unrest and
campus disorders" although the "judicious use of restraint by governors and legislative leaders has kept and will keep the number of laws enacted in 1969 in this area
down to less than two per state."
268Natonal Ass'n of State Univs. and Land-Grant Colleges, Circular No. 161,
Feb. 12, 1971. One reason for the lower number of campus unrest statutes passed
during 1970 is that 11 state legislatures did not convene during that year, and only
three state legislatures were not in session in 1969.
269
See also id. § 28.Mic-L STAT. ANN. § 28.790(41) (Cum. Supp. 1971).
790(42) (Cum. Supp. 1971) (a misdemeanor to intentionally enter a university building to injure another person or disrupt the customary function of the institution).
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istrator, faculty member or student of any university, college, community college or public school who is in the peaceful discharge or
conduct of his duties or studies," as well as for "any person, singly
or in concert with others, to intimidate by threat of force or violence
any administrator, faculty member or student of any university, college, community college or public school who is in the peaceful discharge or conduct of his duties or studies. ' 170 In 1969, the Nevada
Legislature made unlawful the commission of "any act in a public
building [including any 'component of the University of Nevada
System used for any university purpose'l or on the public grounds
surrounding such building which interferes with the peaceful conduct of activities normally carried on in such building or on such
grounds" by any person who "refuses to leave such building or
grounds upon request by the proper official." 2 1 Likewise, on July
2, 1969, the Governor of Florida approved a state legislative enactment making it a misdemeanor "for any person to intentionally act
to disrupt or interfere with the lawful administration or functions of
any educational institution in this state. '27 2 A 1966 Maryland statute provides that if any person refuses to leave a public building or
grounds of a public institution, having been requested to do so by
an authorized employee, and the "surrounding circumstances are such
as to indicate to a reasonable man that such person ... is acting in
a manner disruptive of and disturbing to the conduct of normal
business by such . . . institution," a fine or imprisonment shall re273
sult.
Undoubtedly, the most extensive state legislation setting criminal penalties for the disturbance of or interference with the operations of an institution of higher education was passed by the Ohio
General Assembly in 1970.274 The new legislation added four types
of proscribed disruptive acts to the Ohio Criminal Code, under the
general heading of "Offenses Against Society." The acts, when committed on either public or private college or university campuses, are
punishable as misdemeanors. The new provisions specify that no
person, under circumstances "which create a substantial risk of disrupting the orderly conduct of lawful activities at a college or university" shall willfully or knowingly (1) enter upon the premises
of a college or university without permission or refuse to depart such
270
271
2 72

2 73

WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.10.570-.571
NEv. REv. STAT.
FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 203.119

(1970).

(1969).

§ 877.13 (Supp. 1971).

MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 577A(2) (repl. vol., 1971).
274 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.61, 3345.22-.26 (Page Supp. 1970).

19711

CAMPUS UNREST

premises upon authorized request, (2) violate any condition imposed
during a state of emergency as declared by an institution, (3) urge
or incite others to violate any of the foregoing restrictions, or (4)
disrupt, by force or violence, the orderly conduct of an institution's
lawful activities or engage in any activity which threatens or involves serious injury to persons or property at an institution. In
addition, public colleges and universities are now authorized, through
their boards of trustees or presidents, to declare a state of emergency
when there is a clear and present danger of disruption of orderly
conduct of the institution through riot, mob action, or other substantial disorders, as well as to take action to preserve order and
discipline during the emergency period. The legislation also institutes a special procedure (involving a hearing before a referee, possibly resulting in suspension, with automatic dismissal following a
court conviction) for rapid suspension and dismissal of students,
faculty, or staff from public universities for the commission of one
or more of 20 public offenses, ranging from maiming or disfiguring
a person to "campus disruption."
Other state enactments utilize or extend the law of criminal trespass as a means of preventing campus disturbances. In 1969, the
Maryland General Assembly enacted the following provision:
Whoever shall trespass upon the grounds of the University of
Maryland, any of the State colleges, any community college or public school or who refuses or fails to leave the buildings or grounds
of these institutions after being requested to do so by an authorized employee of the institution, or who wilfully damages or defaces any of the buildings, furnishings, statues, monuments, memorials, trees, shrubs, grasses, or flowers on the grounds of such
institutions shall be guilty of a misdemeanor... .. 7
In 1969, the Tennessee General Assembly wrote into law the following criminal trespass provision:
Any person who enters the campus, buildings, or facilities of a
junior college, state university, or public school and is committing,
or commits, any act which interferes with, or tends to interfere
with, the normal, orderly, peaceful, or efficient conduct of the activities of such campus or facility may be directed by the chief administrative officer, or employee designated by him to maintain
order on such campus or facility, to leave such campus, buildings,
or facilities. If such person fails to do so, he shall be guilty of
trespass .... 276
In some states, criminal trespass, when committed in the course
275 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 577B (repl. vol., 1971).
27 6
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1215 (Supp. 1970).
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of engaging in other operative behavior, has been made a felony.
Thus, a 1969 New York Legislature enactment provides:
A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree when
he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building, and
when, in the course of committing such crime, he:
1. Possesses, or knows that another participant in the crime
possesses, an explosive or a deadly weapon; or
2. Possesses a firearm, rifle or shotgun . . . and also possesses
or has readily accessible a quantity of ammunition which is capable
of being discharged from such firearm, rifle or shotgun; or
3. Knows that another participant in the crime possesses a
firearm, rifle or shotgun
under circumstances described in subdivision two [above].2 77
Campus unrest has also resulted in a number of antiloitering
statutes, typified by an enactment of Tennessee's General Assembly,
which makes it a misdemeanor "to loiter at night upon or about the
grounds of any public school or the grounds of any church property.''12 8 Related statutes, such as that enacted in Oklahoma in 1970,
attempt to cope with the campus activities of nonstudents by providing that any person not a student, officer, or employee who refuses
to leave the campus facilities of any college, university, or public
27 9
school upon request is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Another form of criminal provision often resorted to by state legislatures to curb campus unrest has been an amplification of the concept of "disorderly conduct." A provision passed by the Tennessee
General Assembly in 1970 makes it a misdemeanor for any person
"to disturb the peace of others by violent, profane, indecent, offensive or boisterous conduct or language; or by conduct calculated to
provoke violence or a violation of the law." 8 0 In 1969, the California Legislature made it a misdemeanor to maliciously and willfully disturb the peace or quiet of any junior college, state college,
or state university by loud or unusual noise, offensive conduct, or
threatening, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting, or by using
28
any vulgar, profane, or indecent language. '
Several states now impose criminal penalties on those who carry
firearms on college or university property without authorization. As
an illustration, a New York State statute (effective September 1,
1969) provides that "[a]ny person who knowingly has in his pos277 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.17 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
278
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1211 (Supp. 1970).
279
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1373 (Supp. 1971).
2 80
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1213 (Supp. 1970).
281 CAL. PENAL CODE § 415.5 (West Supp. 1971).
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session a rifle, shotgun or firearm in or upon a building or the
grounds, used for educational purposes, of any school, college or university without the written authorization of such educational institution . ... " is guilty of a misdemeanor.282 Similarly, an Alabama
statute provides that any person possessing materials for assembling
or manufacturing fire bombs, and intending to use such firebombs
once assembled or manufactured for the purpose of violating any
state or federal criminal law is guilty of a misdemeanor.28
Other newly enacted criminal statutes impose punishment for
damaging property of any educational institution, 84 wrongfully entering public facilities,286 and assembling unlawfully. 8 6
In addition to criminal enactments, civil laws of various states
have also been implemented in the hope of extinguishing student
disturbances. These civil provisions often appear in the form of
threatened revocation of state financial assistance, particularly the
denial of individual assistance following conviction in a court of
law. For example, a Tennessee enactment provides that "[a]ny
part-time or full-time student who is convicted of any criminal offense growing out of any student riot, protest, or disturbance shall
forfeit any further right to any student loan or financial assistance
supported by state funds," and any aid being received by a student
at the time of such a conviction "shall be immediately terminated." 8 7
A similar condition on student financial aid now exists in Oklahoma, where student loans, grants, fellowships, teaching fellowships,
or other means of financial assistance from either state or federal
funds may be revoked or terminated for such activities as rioting,
and selling illegal drugs. 88 In California, any student convicted of
a campus disruption charge is ineligible for state educational assistance for a period of at least one semester and up to 2 years.2 89
In apparent emulation of the United States Congress,290
several
states have added provisions to appropriation acts denying state aid
thereunder to students engaging in various forms of campus unrest.
For example, the Michigan Legislature added to its appropriation act
282

(McKinney 1967).
125(16) (Supp. 1969).
284 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 10A531 (Supp. 1970).
285See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-551(2) (Supp. 1969).
2 83

28 6

N.Y. PENAL

LAW § 265.05(10)

ALA. CODE tit. 14,

§

See, e.g., TEx. PEN. CODE art. 295a (Supp. 1971).
TTENN. CODE ANN. § 49-4120 (Supp. 1970).
2
88 OKL.& STAT. ANN. tit 70, § 624 (Supp. 1970).
289 CAL. EDuc. CODE § 31291 (West Supp. 1971).
290 See section III supra.
28
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for state institutions of higher education for fiscal year 1971 language prohibiting the use of state funds for "the education of students convicted of the offense of interference with normal operations of any public institution of higher education"29' 1 or for the
education of students who possess any firearm or other dangerous
weapon in any university unless the weapon is registered therewith. 9 '
Still another condition of this appropriation act provides "that a student who causes wilful damage to public property on a campus or
other facility of a college or university and subject to all other legal
penalties shall be expelled from the college or university."29 Similarly, the Illinois State Legislature inserted in an appropriation measure for higher education a section denying payments to faculty
members or other university employees convicted of interfering with
a public institution of higher education and also proscribing the use
of funds thereunder for the education of students convicted of that
offense.2 94
Some state legislatures have enacted provisions which operate to
revoke or deny assistance to institutions which fail to meet certain
requirements. As an illustration, a New York statute (effective
April 21, 1969) requires the governing board of "every college
chartered by the regents or incorporated by special act of the legislature" to "adopt rules and regulations for the maintenance of public order on college campuses and other college property used for
educational purposes and provide a program for the enforcement
thereof." Such rules and regulations must then be filed with the
regents and the commissioner of education; failure to do so renders
such college ineligible "to receive any state aid or assistance until
such rules and regulations are duly filed."29' 5
Under a 1970 Florida statute, the Board of Regents of the state
universities, in adopting regulations relating to admission of prospective students, must take into account any past actions of an applicant which have been determined to have disrupted or interfered
with the orderly conduct, processes, functions or programs of any
296
university, college or junior college.
291 [1970] Mich. Pub. Act No. 83, § 9.
2

921d. § 10.
293 Id. § 11.
294 See, e.g., [1970] Ill.
Pub. Act § 76-2339 appropriation for the University of
Illinois. This offense is defined in ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 21.2-2 (Smith-Hurd
1970).
See also proposed House Bills 822, 823, Ill.
77th Gen. Ass'y, Reg. Sess.
(1971).
2 95

2 96

N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6450 (McKinney Supp. 1971).

FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 240.052(2) (c) (Supp. 1971).
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Other approaches to campus unrest devised by state legislatures
include mandatory adoption of campus regulations,29 7 automatic
suspension of students under certain circumstances (such as possession of drugs29 ), regulation of campus speakers,2 99 increase in the
out-of-state tuition,300 bans on unauthorized sound equipment,30 1
30 2
and, of course, investigative studies.
From this overview it can be seen that state legislatures have
matched or surpassed the efforts of Congress to curb campus unrest.
The suspicion is, however, that the stringency of these state statutes,
like that of their federal counterparts, will do as much to exacerbate campus unrest as to quell it. Overlooked by both the federal
and state legislators is the fact that the burden of maintaining an
appropriate academic climate lies with the colleges and universities
themselves. And these institutions are best able to deal with most
forms of campus unrest.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Government response to contemporary campus unrest is manifested at all levels - federal, state, and local - and is involving
all branches - legislative, executive, and judicial. Campus unrest
is producing a variety of studies (both government and privately
297 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.045 (Supp. 1971), which reads:
In addition to such other rules and regulations as are required for the
management and operation of the state university system, the board of regents
shall adopt rules and regulations for the lawful discipline of any student, faculty member, or member of the administrative staff who intentionally acts to
impair, interfere with, or obstruct the orderly conduct, processes, and functions of a state university. Said rules and regulations may apply to acts conducted on or off campus when relevant to such orderly conduct, processes,
and functions.
Similarly, in 1970, the Arizona Legislature ordered the governing boards of the state's
educational institutions to establish rules and regulations governing the conduct of students, faculty, and other staff, and members of the public while on the institution's
property. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-1093 (Supp. 1970). See also id. § 13-1092 (containing substantial penalties for those who would interfere with the peaceful conduct
of educational institutions).
298 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 239.582 (Supp. 1971).
299 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 74, Mo. 75th Gen. Ass'y, Reg. Sess. (1969).
30 0
Out-of-state tuition was increased in Connecticut as a result of some incidents
at the University of Connecticut. See J. Gonzalez, Jr., sApra note 267.
301 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-213 (Supp. 1969).
302 The Legislature of New Mexico attempted to establish a joint committee of the
legislature to study the policies and administrative structure of state-supported institutions of higher education and related administrative agencies. Ch. 88, [1970] N.M.
Laws. However, the act was vetoed by the Governor on March 5, 1970.
Commissions have been established by a state executive branch in New York, for
example, where the Governor established the so-called Henderson Commission, which
issued a report in early 1970.
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sponsored30 3) and proposals, and is increasingly transforming the
nature and goals of the American higher education system." 4 Campus unrest is also generating a multitude of new federal and state
statutes, is affecting federal and state support of higher education,
and is stimulating a rapid expansion in legal concepts of academic
freedom.
This panorama of developments is not to be regarded lightly,
for these developments raise profound issues of federal-state, university-government, and student/faculty-government relations. We
shall not dwell on the oft-discussed question of which governmental
responses to campus unrest are most appropriate;3 0 5 we believe, however, that the answers lie in the realization that unrest on our campuses mirrors unrest in our society generally, or, more accurately perhaps, is but one component of domestic unrest.
Further governmental response to campus unrest will largely be
a product of the nature and frequency of future manifestations of
such unrest. The national assumption early into 1971 appears to be
that campus disruptions and violence are receding, and that college
and university students, more apathetic than angry, are returning to
former academic pursuits. Thus, one commentator concludes that
"[a]fter six years of mounting campus turmoil, students seem suddenly to have reverted to a quiet, private style of life."30 6 The President of Yale University, Kingman Brewster, is quoted as saying that
the new mood on the campuses is one of "eerie tranquillity."3

7

And

a February, 1971, Gallup Poll announced the discovery that college students now reject radical politics.3 0 8 Countless other commentaries are perpetuating the same theme: that the campuses will
remain serene because the students have rejected the ways of vioYet the likelihood of further campus dislence and "revolution." '
ruption persists. "[E]arlier reports of student apathy, fatigue,
passive alienation or rejection of mass protest may have been premature," writes one observer, but "the real test will come in the spring
303 See notes, 5, 9, 21, 22, 24, 74 supra.
304

See S. HOOK, AcADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIc

ANARCHY, chs. 1 &

7

(1970).
305 See, e.g., CAMPUS UNREST REPORT, supra note 9, at 7-15, 213-31.
306TIME, Feb. 22, 1971, at 14.
807

Id.

308 Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 1971, § A, at 4.
30

E.g., Childs, Students Grow More Tolerant, Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 1971, § A, at
19, col. 3; Karnow, Campus Apathy on War, id.; Wall Street J., Feb. 10, 1971, at 1, col.
1 (Eastern ed.); cf. Stern, 'Kidology' - A Revival, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 1971 § A, at
19, col. 6.
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when prospects for trouble reach a customary seasonal peak."3 10
Changes on the domestic scene (including the next round of national elections) and in foreign affairs (particularly any escalation
of the Indochina War311 ) could bring renewed campus disorders.
Thus, whether the coming months will signal true campus calm or
another cycle of student/faculty action and government reaction remains to be seen.
Relative quiet on the campus may well forestall the harsher varieties of governmental reaction. On the other hand, should the academic years ahead bear witness to disruptive and violent modes of
campus unrest, more punitive legislation from Congress and state
legislatures can be safely predicted. The latter development would
increase the pressure on colleges and universities to promulgate and
enforce stronger regulations governing campus behavior, and would
add to the growing burdens on legislatures and courts to distinguish
legitimate dissent and participation in policy formulation from illegal
protest and violence.
Campus unrest is not a matter readily susceptible to federal control or "solution." Although there are certain efforts the federal
government can undertake to indirectly minimize the more extreme
forms of unrest - for example, regulation of interstate transportation of explosives and provision of assistance to state and local governments in improving law enforcement techniques" - its most
effective response to campus unrest would be through the following
twofold approach. First, Congress should reexamine the nature and
levels of federal support of higher education and reevaluate the use
of institutions of higher education as instruments of government
policy. Second, the Administration should adhere to the advice of
its Commission on Campus Unrest that "[c~ampus unrest, together
with the unrest that exists throughout our society, frames issues that
the American people cannot ignore,"318 and devote itself to restoring
faith throughout the American public that their national government is capable of coping with the large issues of domestic concern.
With regard to the latter objective, Professor Kenneth Keniston has
recommended that the federal government give particular attention to
major changes in national policies [including) (1) an end to the
war in Vietnam and a change in foreign policy so that any other
310 Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1971, § A, at 5, col. 3.
311 Once again, teach-ins in protest of the Indochina War are being organized.

Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1971, § A, at 12, col. 3.
3 12
See CAMPUS UNREST REPORT, supra note 9, ch. 5.
13Id. at 214.

See
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such war becomes impossible, (2) a reallocation of national resources to end structural racism and to begin to eliminate poverty,
(3) a commitment to provide assistance to the impoverished nations of the world, (4) a sustained national effort to preserve a
livable environment, and (5) an intensive examination of the adequacy of the existing political, social, and economic institutions of
American society 314
in light of the needs of the last third of the
twentieth century.
Governmental response to contemporary campus unrest has been
largely couched in negativism. The challenge ahead for government leaders is to resist the temptation to play politics with campus
unrest, and to pursue policies that advance the national interest, reduce unrest in our society at large, and, at the same time, enable
college and university administrators to cope with campus disturbances by means of methods tailored to the needs of individual institutions. Senator William B. Saxbe (R-Ohio) has expressed the
following view:
There is very little that the Federal Government can or ought
to do about this danger [of student dissidents who advocate violence]. The answer lies in adequate law enforcement at the local
level; but perhaps more important than that, it lies in the ability of
the dissidents among the students and the faculty at each of these
institutions [to make it] dear that tolerance of violence has ended,
that the "crazies," as they have been colloquially dubbed, are endangering not only the reforms that are sought, but that they are
perceived to be a menace by the peaceful dissidents. Until the
heavy-handed
campus revulsion drives the violent minority out,
3 15
Federal reaction will only add fuel to the flame.
As long as dissatisfaction with the policies and actions of our
national government exists, there will be some degree of campus
unrest. Thus, the higher education community must move to ward
off harmful, repressive and often retaliatory governmental response.
Colleges and universities must effectively "govern themselves [or]
31 6
they will be governed by others.1
31 4

Keniston, What's Bugging the Students?, 51 EDUCATIONAL RECORD 116
(1970). President Nixon, in a letter responding to the report of the Commission on
Campus Unrest, complimented Chairman William W. Scranton with the following remark: "[In] your report you have clearly avoided the clich6 that the only way to end
campus violence is to solve once and for all the social problems that beset our nation ..... XIX HIGHER EDUCATION AND NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Dec. 18, 1970, at 7.
3 15
Saxbe, Student Unrest and the Law, 18 CLEV. MAR. L. REv. 429, 435 (1969).
3 16

(1969).
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